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GUILT BY INTUITION: THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
TO CONVICT
STANLEY A. GOLDMANt
The United States Supreme Court has held that prior inconsistent
statements, which have traditionally been admissible to impeach, also
are admissible to show the truth of those prior statements. Professor
Goldman argues that prior inconsistent statements lack the trustworthi-
ness associated with other hearsay exceptions. He argues also that courts
inappropriately have begun to equate substantive admissibility with suffi-
ciency to convict. Convictions based solely on prior inconsistent state-
ments raise serious due process and confrontation clause issues.
Professor Goldman, therefore, proposes that prior inconsistent state-
ments alone should not be sufficient to convict unless two criteria are
met. First, the prior inconsistent statements, at the time they were
made, must have been subject to some form of cross-examination, and,
second, there must be some factual basis in the record to support credit-
ing the prior statements over the in-court testimony.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was like many other teenage parties, except for the guest list-attending
were members of five rival neighborhood street gangs. By the evening's end,
those attending had exchanged insults and, eventually, gunshots. One person
was killed.
When the police arrived one gang member told them that she had seen a
member of another gang fire the fatal shot. She identified the culprit and de-
scribed him as having fired his gun while standing across the street from the
deceased. At the murder trial,1 however, this eyewitness denied the truth of her
prior out-of-court identification. The prosecution's only evidence linking the
accused to the commission of the crime was the witness' now recanted prior out-
of-court statement into evidence. The court admitted the statement into evi-
dence. Fortunately for the defendant, an autopsy report revealed that the de-
ceased had died from a contact wound, a type of wound that occurs only when a
t Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. 1972, University of
California at Los Angeles; S.D. 1975, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
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gun is fired from a position almost touching its target.2 The accused could not
have fired the fatal shot from across the street as described in the witness' prior
statement. The court returned a verdict of not guilty.
In this case concrete circumstantial evidence existed to establish that the
prior statement was false. Had the autopsy report not existed, however, the
defendant might have been convicted solely on the recanted prior statement. 3
Experienced criminal lawyers know that people tend to believe the prior state-
ments rather than the in-court repudiation.4 However, the danger of unreliabil-
ity is inherent in the substantive evidentiary use of any out-of-court assertion 5
and never more so than with the use of a prior inconsistent statement, the truth
of which the declarant-witness denies at trial. When a trier of fact decides to
believe a witness' prior out-of-court assertions 6 rather than that same witness'
present in-court contradiction of those earlier remarks, that decision often is
based solely on guess or intuition, not credible facts. This inherent danger is
compounded when that prior inconsistent statement is the only prosecution evi-
dence against the accused and becomes the sole basis for conviction. 7
Could a verdict based solely on such evidence be permissible under the due
process clause? Triers of fact are of course given considerable discretion in
weighing the evidence and reaching their legal conclusions. Even when evidence
of criminal guilt is overwhelming, the fact finder may enter an irreversible ac-
quittal. However, courts have never held that the jury's power to err in favor of
innocence justifies a corresponding right to enter an unreasonable finding of
2. J. MASON, FORENSIC MEDICINE FOR LAWYERS 88-91 (2d ed. 1983).
3. California, where this case was actually tried, is one of the few jurisdictions in which a prior
inconsistent statement standing alone may be insufficient to justify a conviction. See infra text ac-
companying notes 119-29.
4. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1051 (1969), for example, involved a mother and teenaged daughter who had claimed that
defendant, husband and father, had been having sexual relations with the daughter. The com-
plaining witness and her mother had made these accusations to both the police and the prosecutor.
Id. at 649-50, 441 P.2d at 113-14, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02. At trial, however, both witnesses recanted
their earlier stories, stating that their prior statements were fabrications. They testified that defend-
ant had not had sexual intercourse with his daughter. Id. at 649, 441 P.2d at 113, 68 Cal. Rptr. at
601. The jurors chose to believe the prior, now recanted, statements rather than the witnesses'
present, in-court testimony and found Johnson guilty as charged. Id. at 647, 441 P.2d at 112, 68
Cal. Rptr. at 600. Under these facts the California Supreme Court struck down, as an unconstitu-
tional denial of confrontation, a California rule of evidence that had authorized the substantive ad-
missibility of prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 660, 441 P.2d at 120-21, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09;
see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). The court reversed the conviction based on this evi-
dence's inadmissibility and, consequently, never reached the question of the prior statement's suffi-
ciency to convict. Id. at 660, 441 P.2d at 121, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 609. The decision to hold such
evidence inadmissible, however, was short lived. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
5. "Due process also requires that the defense be given ample opportunity to alert the jury to
the pitfalls of accepting hearsay at face value, and the defendant would, of course, upon request be
entitled to cautionary instructions." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970); cf MAN-
UAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 6.17, 33 F.R.D. 601 (1963) (no cau-
tionary instructions needed when witness is available to both parties).
6. In this Article "out-of-court" refers to any statement not made at the present judicial pro-
ceeding, even if the statement is testimony taken at an earlier judicial proceeding.
7. "The question whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central
to the basic question of guilt or innocence. The constitutional necessity of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not confined to those defendants who are morally blameless." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 323 (1979).
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guilt.8 Due process protection limits the jury's ability to convict. 9 The United
States Supreme Court has long acknowledged that due process prohibits a crimi-
nal conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 This rule requires
more than a ritualistic trial. 1  The Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia12
noted:
A "reasonable doubt," at a minimum, is one based upon "reason."
Yet a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it
can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the same may be said of a trial judge sitting as a
jury.13
The Court concluded in Jackson that reversal is mandated when a convic-
tion is based on proof of less than beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the jury
was properly instructed.' 4 This Article raises the question whether, in the ab-
sence of effective safeguards to assure reliability, a conviction based solely on a
witness' out-of-court inconsistent statement satisfies the requirements of due
process as set forth in Jackson.
No hearsay 15 exception or exemption 16 has been subject to more thorough
analysis in the past twenty years than that for prior inconsistent statements. 17
8. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979); see also United Bd. of Carpenters and
Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) (Court held that refusal to properly instruct jury
was reversible error, "no matter how conclusive the evidence" pointing to guilt); cf. Capital Traction
Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (judge can set aside jury's verdict "if in his opinion it is against
the law or the evidence").
9. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
10. Id. at 316; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Court recognized reasonable doubt
standard as essential to due process).
11. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979).
12. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
13. Id. at 317.
14. Id.
15. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as follows:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct
of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(C).
16. The Federal Rules of Evidence divide traditional hearsay exceptions into two categories:
exceptions and exemptions. Exemptions, prior out-of-court statements submitted to prove their
truth but defined by the Federal Rules as nonhearsay, include all admissions made by a party to the
litigation, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), as well as many prior statements made by a testifying witness,
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). As a matter of convenience and in recognition of tradition, this Article
treats exemptions as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
17. For examples of some, but not all, of the articles dealing with the substantive admissibility
of prior inconsistent statements, the reader is referred to the following materials: Baker, The Right
to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay
May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Beaver, Attending Witnesses Prior
Declarations As Evidence: Theory vs. Reality, 3 IND. L. REV. 309 (1970); Bein, Prior Inconsistent
Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(24), 26 UCLA L. REV. 967 (1979); Blakey,
Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3
(1975-76); Blakey, You Can Say That If You Want-The Redefinition of Hearsay in Rule 801 of the
Proposed Rules of Evidence, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 601 (1974); Dow, Criminal Hearsay Rules: Constitu-
tional Issues, 53 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1974); Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeach-
ment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of
1986]
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Preoccupied with the admissibility of such statements, courts and scholars have
paid comparatively little attention to whether prior inconsistent statements
alone can provide the basis of a constitutionally valid conviction. Although the
United States Supreme Court has upheld the substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements as constitutionally valid,18 it has never decided specifi-
cally whether such a statement alone could be sufficient to convict. As a result,
there has been little consistency among lower federal and state courts on the
question of sufficiency.19
Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1565 (1977); Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REv. 151 (1978); Graham, The
Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL, 99 (1972); Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 67 (1969);
Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207 (1984);
Ordover, Surprisel That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still With Us: An Analysis of Federal Rules
of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HoFsTRA L. REv. 65 (1976); Peeples, Prior Inconsistent
Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules,
52 TEx. L. REv. 1383 (1974); Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doc-
trine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40
GEO. VASH. L. REv. 76 (1971); Silbert, FederalRule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 49 TEMP. L.Q. 880
(1976); Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes A Compromising Step Backward in
Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J 251 (1977); Wieder & Speed, Evidence-Hearsay
and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Practitioner's Guide, 1977 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 621;
Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, and a Peek Forward, 1 HOfSTRA L. REv.
32 (1973).
18. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
19. See United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding there was insufficient
proof of defendant's guilt when the sole evidence against defendant was prior grand jury testimony
of one witness and prior written statement of another, neither of which were confirmed at trial). In
United States v. Hines, 18 M.L 729, 741 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), when the two victims and their mother
refused to testify at trial, their sworn statements were submitted under MILITARY R. EVID.
804(b)(5). Because no evidence existed contradicting the out-of-court statements, the court held
those declarations alone sufficient to convict. Id. at 743-44; see also In re Miguel L., 32 Cal. 3d 100,
649 P.2d 703, 185 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1982) (conviction allowed to stand based solely on a prior incon-
sistent statement when that statement was confirmed at a judicial proceeding and when there was
some basis in the record to credit that prior statement despite the in-court recantation); People v.
Ford, 30 Cal. 3d 209, 635 P.2d 1176, 178 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1981) (pretrial identification made at a
preliminary examination, later repudiated at trial, was sufficient to convict), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1003 (1982); People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980) (prior
statements made by rival gang member at a preliminary examination were the sole basis for convic-
tion); In re Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979) (victim's out-of-court
statement, which could not be confirmed at trial, was held insufficient to sustain defendant's convic-
tion); People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971) (witness' inconsistent
statements made to police officer and later at preliminary hearing were properly admitted against
defendant under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966)), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); People
v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960) (en banc) (extrajudicial photo-
graphic identification that the witness did not confirm at trial was insufficient to convict absent other
inculpatory evidence); People v. Brown, 150 Cal. App. 3d 968, 198 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1984) (defend-
ant's conviction sustained even though the only evidence presented against him was the out-of-court
statement of a witness who recanted at trial); Webb v. State, 426 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
petition for cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1983) (Defendant's conviction was based on the grand
jury testimony of the victim and her mother, which was later repudiated at trial. These out-of-court
declarations were considered not hearsay under the Florida statute and thus substantively admissi-
ble.); State v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (A Florida statute permitted the
substantive consideration of out-of-court incriminating statements made by four eyewitnesses, two of
whom testified under oath before a grand jury. Even though all of the witnesses recanted their
testimony subsequent to the indictment, the court considered this evidence to be sufficient substan-
tive evidence so that a dismissal of the indictment was not required. This suggests that such evi-
dence may also have been sufficient to sustain a conviction.); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286
S.E,2d 717 (1982) (court upheld murder conviction based primarily on unsworn prior inconsistent
statements witness allegedly made to police officer); People v. Lucas, 58 Il. App. 3d 541, 374 N.E.2d
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This Article addresses the issue of conviction based solely on an incriminat-
ing prior inconsistent statement. 20 The Article first summarizes the history of
the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, demonstrates why
these statements lack the trustworthiness associated with longer established
hearsay exceptions, and illustrates how courts have inappropriately equated ad-
missibility with sufficiency to convict. Second, the Article analyzes the confron-
tation and due process issues raised by a conviction based solely on such
statements. Last, the Article proposes a standard that courts should apply in
determining whether a trier of fact has correctly judged such evidence to be
sufficient. This suggested standard requires that no prior inconsistent statement
shall be sufficient to convict unless, at the time the statement was made, it was
subject to some form of cross-examination 2 t and there is some reasonable fac-
tual basis appearing in the record to credit the prior inconsistent statement over
the present in-court testimony.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS
When a witness testifies at a judicial proceeding, the witness' previous re-
marks inconsistent with his or her present testimony are admissible, at least for
limited purposes. For years the general rule,22 sometimes referred to as the or-
thodox rule, 23 provided that a witness' prior inconsistent statements could be
884 (1978) (conviction founded solely upon prior inconsistent statement overturned in a jurisdiction
then, but no longer, governed by orthodox rule of admissibility); State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 366
P.2d 868 (1961) (defendant's conviction may have rested on additional evidence other than the prior
inconsistent statements of the defendant's brother); State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182
(N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting favorably 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE
§ 801-76.1, "The fact that the prior statement is admitted and given substantive effect does not mean
that it will suffice as the sole basis for a conviction."); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973)
(sworn testimony of a witness given before a grand jury proceeding was sufficient to sustain defend-
ant's conviction).
20. Inconsistencies range from minor discrepancies between the two versions, to the recantation
of the witness' earlier comments, to denials that the prior statements were ever made.
[H]earsay evidence, ranging as it does from mere thirdhand rumors to sworn affidavits of
credible observers, has as wide a scale of reliability, from the highest to the lowest, as we
find in testimonial or circumstantial evidence generally, depending as they all do upon the
frailties of perception, memory, narration, and veracity of men and women.
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 728 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. Prior incon-
sistent statements must, by definition, fall at the lower end of the reliability scale because the out-of-
court declarant is now in court and, while under oath, is testifying in a manner inconsistent with his
or her prior out-of-court statements.
21. The quality of the cross-examination to which the prior statement was subjected is not
analyzed in this Article. The opportunity to cross-examine satisfies this prong of the proposed stan-
dard regardless of whether counsel takes advantage of that opportunity. However, the quality, or
lack thereof, of the actual cross-examination can affect the second prong of the proposed standard-
whether there is a reasonable factual basis in the record to credit the prior statement over the present
in-court testimony.
22. See 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 998 n.3 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); see also United
States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 1960) ("The orthodox rule has been virtually uni-
versally accepted by the courts in both criminal and civil cases.").
23. [T]he traditional view had been that a prior statement of a witness is hearsay if offered
to prove the happening of matters asserted therein. This categorization has not, of course,
precluded using the prior statement for other purposes, eg., to impeach the witness by
showing a self-contradiction if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony.... But the
1986]
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used to impeach that witness' credibility, but could not be considered by the
trier of fact as proof of the truth of the matters they asserted. When such state-
ments are submitted for impeachment purposes only, the theory of admissibility
"is not based on the assumption that the present testimony is false and the for-
mer statement true but rather upon the notion that talking one way on the stand
and another way previously is blowing hot and cold, and raises a doubt as to the
truthfulness of both statements." 24 When submitted for this limited purpose,
prior inconsistent statements are not categorized as hearsay because they are not
offered to prove their truth.2 5
A major deviation from the orthodox rule appeared in 1965 with the pas-
sage of California Evidence Code section 1235.26 California became the first
state to permit the use of all prior inconsistent statements both for impeachment
purposes and to prove the truth of those prior statements. This change, how-
ever, did not gain immediate national acceptance. Proponents of the orthodox
rule warned that if such prior statements were substantively admissible against
criminal defendants, the inability to "cross-examine" the statement at the time it
was made would not allow adequate confrontation as the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution requires. 27 Reflecting the view held by courts
adhering to the orthodox position, the California Supreme Court has noted:
"The chief merit of cross-examination is not that at some future time it gives the
party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in
its immediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is
hot."' 28 Based on this rationale the California Supreme Court subsequently de-
clared section 1235 unconstitutional when used against defendants in criminal
cases.
29
In California v. Green,30 however, the United States Supreme Court resur-
rected section 1235 by rejecting the California court's earlier interpretation of
the sixth amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White held that "[tihere is
good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admit-
ting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as
prior statement has been admissible as proof of matter asserted therein, Le., as "substan-
tive" evidence, only when falling within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
logic of the orthodox view is that the previous statement of the witness is hearsay since its
value rests on the credit of the declarant, who, when the statement was made, was not
(1) under oath, (2) in the presence of the trier, or (3) subject to cross-examination.
MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 744.
24. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 744; see also 3A WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1017, at 993-95
(inconsistent statements of a witness demonstrate capacity to err).
25. For the definition of hearsay, see supra note 15.
26. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) provides as follows: "Evidence of a statement made
by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his
testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770."
27. See People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1968). But see
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (confrontation clause does not exclude prior statements of
witness who concedes making the statements and may have to explain an inconsistency at trial).
28. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 656, 441 P.2d 111, 118, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 606 (1968)
(citing State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939)).
29. See People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
30. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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a witness and is subject to full and effective cross-examination. '31
In spite of the Green Court's elimination of the constitutional barriers, there
was little additional movement away from the orthodox position until the 1975
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides for the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, 32 so long as those
statements were made while the declarant was under oath. (This is in contrast
to the California rule that allows all such statements into evidence irrespective of
oath. Neither rule, however, requires that the witness' prior remarks be subject
to cross-examination when made.) Congressional acceptance of the substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements proved very influential. Within the next
decade, a majority of states adopted rules permitting the use of prior inconsistent
statements to prove their truth as well as for impeachment purposes.33
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE REASONS FOR ABANDONING THE
ORTHODOX RULE
There are two primary justifications for the abandonment of the orthodox
rule. First, the prior statement is more trustworthy than the present in-court
testimony because it was made closer in time to the event that it describes. 34
Second, because the declarant is present at trial, the defendant has an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the declarant effectively concerning the earlier out-of-
court assertion and thereby reveal any inaccuracies in those prior remarks.35
Though these two rationales arguably offer a conceptual basis for finding the
earlier statements sufficiently trustworthy to permit their admission, the reliabil-
ity of this evidence is still highly suspect. Moreover, even assuming that the
evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, neither rationale for admission
provides sufficient justification for accepting such out-of-court assertions as the
sole basis for conviction. 36
31. Id. at 158.
32. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) states:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with
his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,
or other proceeding, or in a deposition ... 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
33. See Appendix.
34. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 745; see, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(b)
(1942).
35. "The major justification offered to support a hearsay exception for prior statements by
available declarants is that the declarant's presence at trial provides an opportunity for cross-exami-
nation which protects against many of the same dangers that the hearsay rule is designed to avoid."
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 507 (2d ed. 1982).
36. In addition, it is argued that the change from the orthodox rule to a rule permitting the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is simply a recognition of the realities of the
courtroom. Under the orthodox rule the trier of fact was permitted to consider the prior statement,
but only for impeachment purposes and only under the control of a limiting instruction. The ability
to follow the dictates of such a limiting instruction and not consider the statement for its truth may
be beyond the abilities of most jurors. Therefore, it was suspected that most jurors were in fact
considering the prior statements for their truth as well as for impeachment purposes in spite of the
limiting instruction to the contrary. In discussing the orthodox rule, Maguire noted:
1986]
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Under the first rationale, because the prior statement is made closer in time
to the event it describes, the declarant is not as likely to fabricate or forget the
truth as he or she would when a greater amount of time has elapsed before the
recantation at trial. This reasoning is similar to the rationale underlying the past
recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.3 7 However, the past recol-
lection recorded exception requires additional assurances of reliability not re-
quired for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement. First, the statement
must have been recorded close in time to the event described. Second, the state-
ment must be contained in a writing prepared for the purpose of preserving that
statement. Third, the declarant must take the stand and confirm that, at the
time the prior statement was recorded, it was a true and accurate reflection of
the event observed. On the other hand, a prior inconsistent statement, to be
admissible, need not have been made close in time to the event it describes, but
merely closer in time than the witness' present testimony. Further, in many
jurisdictions38 the prior statement need not be memorialized in a writing, and,
most importantly, a witness' prior inconsistent statement is admissible not when
the witness affirms its accuracy, but rather when the witness testifies in a manner
inconsistent with the truth of that prior statement. Thus, the only reliability-
ensuring safeguard supporting the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements is the fact these statements are made closer in time to the event de-
scribed than the in-court repudiation. Is this minimal guarantee of trustworthi-
ness sufficient to justify a criminal conviction based solely on such evidence?3 9
The second rationale underlying the change from the orthodox rule arises
from the declarant's presence at trial and the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant effectively concerning the prior statement. The trier of fact can ob-
serve the declarant's demeanor and response to the cross-examiner's attempts to
expose the conditions under which the prior statement was made, as well as the
inconsistencies between the prior remarks and the present testimony. It is in the
[T]he contradictory statement is operative only to diminish or nullify the credence given to
the witness' testimony, not to establish that the opposite is the real truth. Some critics say
that this is too refined a distinction for a juror, or perhaps even a judge, to make, and that
the purported limitation of probative effect is mere pretense. But trial lawyers-some good
ones, too-assert that the distinction can easily be made and actually is made every day.
J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 58 (1947). Even if we accept the
criticism of the orthodox rule as a persuasive argument in favor of admitting the prior assertion, this
acceptance does not affect the question whether such statements, once admissible, should be suffi-
cient to support a conviction.
37. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter
was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memo-
randum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
38. See Appendix, Section II.
39. Sufficiency under the due process clause is a different standard than that required for admis-
sibility under the confrontation clause. See infra text accompanying notes 170-81.
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courtroom that the flaws in this seemingly cogent rationale are exposed. As
Professor Maguire has noted, "[M]any trial lawyers will have none of this [argu-
ment]. They say it is a professional pipe-dream. They have in mind considera-
tions of practical policy.. . ."4 What are these practical considerations? When
the prosecution offers into evidence both a witness' testimony and prior inconsis-
tent assertion to establish the truth of the prior statement, there is no in-court
witness presently asserting the truth of that prior statement. The defense has
only a memory to cross-examine. Although defense counsel can question the
declarant about the out-of-court assertion, this cross-examination can rarely be
as effective as questioning that immediately follows the assertion. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has noted, "This practical truth is daily verified by trial law-
yers, not one of whom would willingly postpone to both a later date and a
different forum his right to cross-examine a witness against his client."'4 1
The traditional classification of prior inconsistent statements as inadmissi-
ble hearsay recognizes the difficulty encountered in cross-examining a witness
about that witness' prior out-of-court statement when that statement is offered
for its truth.42 Although today many jurisdictions do define the prior statements
of a witness as nonhearsay,43 many such statements are so classified only in
certain situations.44 For example, the admissibility of prior consistent state-
ments is conditioned on the declarant-witness' ability or willingness while testi-
fying to affirm the accuracy of his or her earlier statement. No such prerequisite
is required for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement.4 5 Cross-examina-
tion can be a fully effective means of testing the truth of an earlier statement
only if a witness testifies consistently with the out-of-court statement. 46 For this
reason the substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements does not pos-
sess the same assurance of reliability as that required for the admission of prior
consistent statements.
The problem for the defense in cross-examining a prosecution witness about
the truth of his or her prior statement exists in its most pristine form when that
40. J. MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 59.
41. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 655, 441 P.2d 111, 118, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 606 (1968).
42. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 73, 115, 744.
43. See Appendix, Sections I and II.
44. See Appendix.
45. See supra note 32. The confrontation clause, however, would seem to preclude admission of
prior inconsistent statements unless the witness-declarant admits having uttered the earlier remarks.
This Court held that "the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence
the prior statements of a witness who concedes making the statements, and who may be
asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his present
version of the events in question, thus opening himself to full cross-examination at trial as
to both stories."
Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 164).
But see Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-39 (1971) ("We conclude that where a codefendant takes
the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the de-
fendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the
defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
46. Paradoxically, this is the one situation that will never arise because the witness must in
some manner contradict his or her earlier remarks before those remarks will be admissible as prior
inconsistent statements. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 744-47.
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witness is unable or unwilling to remember either making the statement or the
event the statement describes. 4 7 Although the witness' presence at trial may
permit the cross-examiner to raise doubt about that witness' general credibility,
cross-examination can only minimally attack the truth of the out-of-court asser-
tion.48 "[I]t is abundantly clear that in this situation cross-examination of the
witness, as a practical matter, is of scarcely more aid in testing the dependability
of the alleged out-of-court statement than would be cross-examination of A to
test the verity of an alleged statement by B."' 4 9 Thus, when the witness suffers a
lapse of memory, the prior statement presents the classic dangers of hearsay. 50
47. When a witness has previously described an event there may be no inconsistency in that
witness later testifying to an inability to remember that event. Some courts have recognized that
there is nothing inconsistent in the fading of human memory. See Clifton v. Ulis, 17 Cal. 3d 99, 549
P.2d 1251, 130 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1976); People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804
(1969).
48. If the declarant does not remember the incident described in the earlier statement or if
the declarant's courtroom testimony is inconsistent with his earlier statement, evidence of
that statement may be the only way of proving what is asserted therein. Yet in these
circumstances the utility of courtroom cross-examination will often be quite limited. The
declarant may fob off any attempt to develop the inconsistencies in or the implausibility of
his earlier statements by saying, "I don't remember." He may deal similarly with efforts to
secure an admission that his vantage point was obscured or his judgment biased. Whether
the declarant's failure of memory is feigned or honest, the jurors are likely to be placed in a
situation where they have only a bare accusation or simple description without any of the
contextual information crucial to a rational determination of the weight the statement
should be accorded. While cross-examination may help clarify ambiguous language and
might give the jurors an idea of the declarant's general trustworthiness, the more signifi-
cant hearsay dangers remain.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 507-08.
49. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. Rv. 43, 53 (1954). The testi-
mony submitted by the prosecution in such a case has been illustrated by Professors Lempert and
Saltzburg:
Situation C: Where the witness denies making an earlier inconsistent statement.
Prosecutor [On direct examination]: Now, can you tell us who sold you the marihuana?
W: No, I cannot.
P: Your honor, the witness' statement is inconsistent with his earlier statements on this
subject. The prosecution is surprised by this testimony and would like to question him as if
on cross-examination in order to clarify certain matters.
J: Go ahead.
P: Do you mean you cannot swear that it was Green who sold you the marihuana? W:
No, I cannot.
P: Do you remember giving a statement to a police officer shortly after you were arrested
with the marihuana? W: No, I don't. I never gave a statement.
P: You are denying that you ever gave any statement to the arresting officer? W: Yes, I
never said anything.
P: That is all, thank you.
P [Questioning Officer Johnson. The circumstances of the arrest have just been de-
scribed.]: What did you say next? J: I said that he was only a juvenile and if he would
cooperate things might go easier for him.
P: What did he say? J: He said, "I bought the dope off of Green. He had hid the baggies
under a bush on his folks' property. I gave him the money and he told me where to look."
P: You're sure he identified Green? J: Yes, I'm certain.
P: Thank you, officer.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 510-11.
50. The confrontation clause may prohibit the admission of the out-of-court assertion under
these circumstances because of the extreme limits on the opportunity to cross-examine. The United
States Supreme Court in Green recognized this fact when it suggested that a witness' lapse of mem-
ory might make a critical difference in providing the accused with an opportunity to cross-examine
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A better opportunity for cross-examination arguably exists when the wit-
ness remembers having made the prior statement, but testifies in a manner in-
consistent with his or her earlier statement. However, even in this situation the
effectiveness of cross-examination is severely limited.51 A witness' repudiation
of his or her earlier out-of-court version of an event during direct examination
simply will not tarnish the truth of that earlier version as would the retraction of
direct testimony during cross-examination at the same proceeding.5 2 "Only a
lawyer without trial experience would suggest that the limited right to impeach
one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination
which has always been regarded as the greatest safeguard of American trial pro-
cedure."15 3 The manner in which evidence is presented can be as important as its
fully and effectively the witness about his or her other out-of-court statements and thus deny the
accused confrontation. "Commentators have noted that in such a case the opportunities for testing
the prior statement through cross-examination at trial may be significantly diminished." Green, 399
U.S. at 169 n. 18. For a more extensive discussion of the problem of the forgetful witness, see Gra-
ham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151
(1978). In addition, the Court's holding in Green would seem to preclude the introduction of the
prior statements of a witness who falls to concede making the prior assertion. Delaware v. Fensterer,
106 S. Ct. 292, 295 (1985). But see Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-39 (1971) ("We conclude
that where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court
statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning
the underlying facts, the defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
51. In this situation also, the quality of cross-examination of the witness' prior statement and
the conditions under which it was made is less than that of a witness' present testimony. For an
illustration of the difficulties in such cross-examination, see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 35, at 508-11.
52. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629 (1971). In Nelson codefendant Runnels gave testi-
mony in court favorable to himself and to defendant O'Neil. During cross-examination by the pros-
ecution Runnels denied having made a prior inconsistent and inculpatory statement to the police.
The Supreme Court, in holding the prior statement admissible against O'Neil, noted that Runnels'
testimony "was more favorable to the respondent than any that cross-examination by counsel could
possibly have produced." Id. However, this portion of the Court's analysis fails to reflect the reali-
ties of cross-examination.
[T]he repudiation of an earlier story on direct examination is not necessarily
equivalent to the retraction of that story on cross-examination.
If testimonial repudiation of an earlier out-of-court statement is likely to be less con-
vincing than the repudiation of direct testimony on cross-examination, it is because the
jury may not believe that contemporaneous cross-examination would have shaken the ear-
lier out-of-court statement. The crucial factor will be whether the witness can offer a satis-
factory explanation for the discrepancy between his out-of-court statement and his
courtroom testimony. Absent a convincing explanation, it is not irrational for the jury to
believe that "the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the
witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and
is less likely to be influenced by the controversy which gave rise to the litigation." How-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that we want to allow convictions or judgments to rest
largely on out-of-court statements that have been contradicted by sworn testimony. There
is something incongruous about resting a verdict on the judgment that someone who can-
not be believed under oath was credible in an earlier unsworn statement. In addition, the
prior statement may have been elicited by the kind of leading questions which would have
been barred on direct examination as unduly suggestive.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 511-12 (quoting California Law Revision Commis-
sion, Comment on Sec. 1235 of the California Evidence Code (1965)).
53. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (quoted with ap-
proval in United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 82 n.39 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[I]t has also been argued that the disadvantage
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content. When a witness, on cross-examination, recants his or her earlier in-
court direct testimony, the trier of fact is present to observe the inconsistencies
and may credit the repudiation as the more accurate account of the disputed
events. However, this is much less likely to occur when the witness testifies on
direct examination inconsistently with his or her out-of-court statement. In the
former situation the jury sees the prosecution's witness discredited on cross-ex-
amination; in the latter, there is no real discrediting but, at best, merely an ex-
planation of why the witness' earlier statement was inaccurate. The impact of
the recantation in the latter situation is much less dramatic than in the former,
and therefore the trier of fact will more likely believe the earlier out-of-court
assertion rather than the in-court testimony. Professors Lempert and Saltzburg
have discussed the difference between these two situations, as illustrated by the
facts of California v. Green:
Situation A: Where the witness on direct examination accuses Green
of selling marihuana and the cross-examiner gets the witness to repudi-
ate the accusation.
Prosecutor [On direct examination]: And will you tell us who sold you
the [marihuana] which was found in your possession? W: It was Mar-
tin Green.
P: And how did this sale occur? Did he hand you the marihuana?
W: No, he pointed to some bushes near his parents' house and said I
would find the baggies there. I did, I found twenty-nine.
P: Thank you, your witness.
Defense Counsel [On cross-examination]: Is marihuana the only
drug you have ever used? W: No, it is not.
D: What other drugs have you used? W: Well, I've dropped acid,
that is, used LSD.
D: What are the effects of dropping acid? W: Well, it makes you
super high. It changes your sense of things, of time, of space. Your
world is different, everything is alive.
D: In short, it distorts your perceptions considerably; isn't that right?
W: Yes.
D: You might be talking to someone and not remember who he is
afterwards?
W: Yes.
D: The features of the person you are talking to might be different,
you might see a nose exaggerated or proportions changed? W: Yes.
D: Now, when was the last time you had dropped acid before you
arranged this marihuana purchase? W: Well, actually I had taken
some about twenty minutes before I got the call from Green telling me
where to go to pick up the marihuana.
D: LSD distorts the perception of voices does it not? W: It may.
D: You really can't be certain it was Green's voice you heard on the
phone, can you? W: No.
the defendant suffers because of the prosecutor's failure to call the extra-judicial declarant is not
ameliorated by the defendant's ability to call the extra-judical declarant as his own witness.").
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D: It's quite possible that someone else had called you up, your best
friend, for example; yet you might have thought it was Green who
called you when the effects wore off? W: Yes.
D: You then went to pick up the baggies. Did you not? W: Yes, I
guess so.
D: What do you mean, I guess so? W: Well, I was still high, so fact
and fantasy are really mixed up in my mind. If I hadn't had the bag-
gies on me when the police came I wouldn't know what I had done.
D: You really aren't sure where you got the marihuana, are you. W:
No.
D: You wouldn't want to swear under oath that Green was your sup-
plier. Would you? W: No.
D: In short, you have no idea where the marihuana came from; isn't
that so? W: Yes.
Situation B: Where the witness acknowledges but repudiates and ex-
plains his earlier inconsistent statement.
Prosecutor [On direct examination]: Now can you tell us who sold
you the marihuana? W: No, I cannot.
P: Your honor, the witness' statement is inconsistent with his earlier
statements on this subject. The prosecution is surprised by this testi-
mony and would like to question him as if on cross-examination in
order to clarify certain matters.
J: Go ahead.
P: Do you mean that you cannot swear that it was Green who gave
you the marihuana? W: No, I cannot.
P: Do you remember giving a statement to a police officer shortly
after you were arrested with the marihuana? W: Yes, I do.
P: And that was soon after you purchased the marihuana, at a time
when your memory of the event was considerably fresher than it is
now. W: Yes.
P: Do you remember giving Officer Johnson, the officer who arrested
you, the following statement, "I bought the dope off of Green. He had
the baggies under a bush on his folks' property. I gave him the money
and he told me where to look." W: Yes, I said that.
P: Thank you.
Defense Counsel [On cross-examination]: You've just testified that
you cannot be sure that Green sold you the marihuana, isn't that right?
W: Yes, it is.
D: In fact, you have no reason to believe it was Green who sold you
the marihuana, do you? W: No.
D: Could you explain why you're unsure about who sold you the
marihuana? W: Yes. You see, I had just dropped acid at the time I
bought the marihuana. That's LSD. It distorts your perception. You
can't be sure of anything. I had this call on the phone telling me about
the dope. The voice might have sounded like Green's, but it could
have been anybody's. Then I went out to pick the stuff up. But, I was
so high I couldn't tell fact from fantasy. When the police came I
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thought the police might go easy on me if I could name my supplier, so
I just picked Green's name out because I knew him as an acquain-
tance. But he wasn't a friend.
D: Thank you.
Prosecutor [On redirect examination]: Just one more question.
When you were arrested you never told the officer that you had just
been taking LSD, did you? W: No.
P: That is all.
Defense Counsel [On recross-examination]: Why didn't you tell the
arresting officer you were high on LSD? W: I was afraid I would get
busted for that, too.
In each of these situations the witness has told two stories. One ac-
cuses the defendant of supplying him with marihuana; the other pro-
fesses an inability to identify the supplier. Yet, the situations are
clearly not equivalent. In situation A, the jury sees the prosecution's
witness discredited on cross-examination. Here they are likely to dis-
count the accusation entirely. In situation B there is no discrediting of
the witness, just an explanation of why his earlier statement was inac-
curate. If the jury accepts the explanation it may discount the accusa-
tion; if it does not, the later courtroom repudiation will be of little help
to the defendant. 54
Of course, there will be cases in which the witness-declarant will success-
fully assist the defense in its goal of discrediting that witness' own prior state-
ment. However, such cooperation on the witness' part is not a prerequisite to
the prior statement's admissibility or to its potential sufficiency. Although the
trier of fact might choose to believe the present explanation and disregard the
prior out-of-court statement, there are likely to be additional reasons, such as
the declarant-witness' poor demeanor on the witness stand,55 that persuade the
trier of fact to disregard the present testimony. When the trier of fact does not
believe the present testimony, that testimony's inconsistencies with the prior
54. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 508-11.
55. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
There are methods by which the defense may lessen the impact of a prosecution witness' incrim-
inatory prior inconsistent statements. Assume, as in the typical case, that the prosecution has called
a civilian eyewitness to the alleged crime and that witness has testified in a manner exculpatory to
the accused. The prosecution now calls a police officer who testifies that the previous witnesses had,
contrary to that witness' present testimony, made prior remarks tending to incriminate the accused.
One potentially useful tactic for the defense would be to list, during cross-examination of the police
officer, all those questions counsel would have asked the civilian witness had the witness testified
consistently with the truth of his out-of-court statement.
For example, assumed that the contested issue is the whereabouts of the accused at 11:00 p.m.
on the night a crime occurred near the corner of 5th and Main. An alleged eyewitness testifies that
he did not see the accused on the evening in question. Subsequently, however, a police officer testi-
fies that that same witness had, in fact, previously told the officer that he had seen the accused at the
corner of 5th and Main at 11:00 on the night of the crime. Cross-examination of the officer should
involve questions such as:
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Question: Officer, did you ask the previous witness whether he was wearing a watch
at the time he allegedly observed the accused?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you ask the witness when he had last seen a clock?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you ask him if he had seen or heard a television or radio program
which enabled him to approximate what time he had allegedly seen the accused?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you ask the witness how much he had had to drink that evening?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you ask him whether he had had any marijuana to smoke that evening
or had consumed any drugs?
Answer: No.
This line of questioning can be duplicated regardless of the issue the prior statement is submit-
ted to prove. For example, suppose the specific place that the accused was standing just prior to the
commission of the offense is relevant and is the subject on which the eyewitness' prior inconsistent
statement was submitted. The questioning of the officer who now testifies to the witness' incrimina-
tory prior inconsistent remarks could proceed as follows:
Question: Officer, did you have the previous witness show you where he was standing
at the time when he allegedly observed the accused?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you yourself stand exactly where the witness had stood so that you
could determine whether there were any shrubs or trees or other obstacles which might
have obstructed a clear observation of the area by the witness?
Answer: No.
Question: Did you ask him whether there was any street light or other form of illumi-
nation at the time he made his observation?
Answer: No.
Police officers will invariably fail to ask the types of questions about which defense counsel are
most concerned. These are simply not the issues that concern the police in the heat of an investiga-
tion. Therefore, unless the officer is prepared to perjure himself, chances are very good that each of
these questions on cross-examination will be answered in the negative. In some cases, there will be a
transcription, tape recording, or other memorialization of the conversation with the alleged eyewit-
ness. If so, defense counsel can be relatively certain of not getting any unexpected affirmative an-
swers, lest the officer subject himself to some obvious impeachment.
This type of questioning may successfully minimize the impact of the prior inconsistent state-
ment by revealing to the jury the untrustworthiness of the out-of-court declaration, particularly if
the declarant himself has now come to court and denied the truth of his own prior remarks. Defense
counsel would then argue to the jury that, because he was unable to cross-examine the witness at the
time the statement was made and the officer did not do this for him, the prior statements should be
given very minimal probative weight. This, of course, is an explanation of the rationale that under-
lies the hearsay rule itself.
Another method through which the defense may discredit the truth of the prior inconsistent
statements of the alleged eyewitness is to reveal the circumstances under which the police obtained
the witness' prior statements. The witness may not have been treated with "kid gloves" at the time
the statements were taken from the witness. In some communities witnesses to a crime may them-
selves be involuntarily removed to the police station for questioning. Although the defendant may
not have a constitutional right to exclude statements obtained under such conditions, revealing to
the jury the circumstances under which the prior statements were made may successfully reduce the
credibility of those statements.
For example, consider a case in which the police officer testified that he had obtained a volun-
tary prior statement from a now recalcitrant witness. The defense introduced a police tape recording
of the witness' statements obtained through discovery. The tape revealed that the witness had begun
making her statement to the police with the following remarks: "Why did you guys grab me off of
that bus stop? When are you going to let me go home to my baby?" Answer: "As soon as you tell
us what we need to know." Such facts, although insufficient to justify the exclusion of the prior
statements on constitutional grounds, may nonetheless adversely affect the credibility of those re-
marks in the minds of many jurors. Based on an interview with Charles Gessler, Deputy Public
Defender, Los Angeles County (October 17, 1986).
This discussion of the tactics a defense attorney might use to minimize the impact of incrimina-
tory prior inconsistent statements is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article. Regardless of the
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statement will not aid the accused.5 6 In most cases cross-examination will lead
to scarcely more than an elaboration of the basis for the witness' present testi-
mony or a more extensive explanation of the reason for the earlier inconsistent
version. Thus, in light of the attendant hearsay dangers, this limited cross-ex-
amination to test the now recanting declarant's out-of-court credibility presents
a weak basis for justifying admission. A fortiori, it can provide little justification
for allowing such out-of-court assertions to stand alone as the basis for
conviction.
Once the courts permit the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements, however, conviction based solely on them is possible. The spectre of
conviction based solely on a prior inconsistent statement clearly concerned
many of the drafters of federal rule 801(d)(1)(A).5 7 Many commentators at-
tempted to minimize this fear of unjust conviction by pointing out that "[t]hose
who fear that a prior inconsistent statement given substantive effect would, in all
cases, be enough to sustain a party's burdens of proof fail to recognize the essen-
tial difference between admissibility and sufficiency." s58 Apparently, many lower
courts that have chosen to sustain criminal convictions based solely on prior
inconsistent statements have failed to appreciate this distinction between admis-
sibility and sufficiency.5 9 In upholding convictions supported by such a record,
effectiveness of defense counsel, the question remains what should be done when the jurors choose to
return a verdict of guilt in the absence of any other substantial evidence linking the defendant to the
commission of the alleged offense.
56. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 511.
57. "It would appear that some of the opposition to this Rule is based on a concern that a
person could be convicted solely upon evidence admissible under this Rule.... Factual circum-
stances could well arise where, if this were the sole evidence, dismissal would be appropriate." S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.21, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7051, 7063 n.21; see Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substan-
tive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(1) (A), 613, and 607, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1565, 1577 (1977).
Others studying rule 801(d)(1)(A) have also reached the conclusion that such evidence alone
should not be sufficient to convict. Professor Edward W. Cleary, the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, suggested that "if a judge were confronted
with a situation, under the rule as transmitted to the Congress, in which the entire case for the
prosecution was a prior inconsistent unsworn statement, it would be difficult indeed to see how he
could avoid directing a verdict." See Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. On Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter
House Comm. on Judiciary]; see also Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 51-52 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary].
For further discussion of this point, see Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3, 20-24 (1975).
58. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a Compromising Step Backward in
Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 LoY. U. CH. L.J. 251, 267 (1977). Professor Stalmack cites the
testimony of Judge Charles Joiner, a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 57, at 36, as well as a letter from Professor
Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the
United States, House Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 57, at 98-99.
59. See United States v. Hines, 18 M.J. 729 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984); People v. Ford, 30 Cal. 3d 209,
635 P.2d 1176, 178 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1981); People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1971); People v. Brown, 150 Cal. App. 3d 968, 198 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1984); Webb v. State, 426 So.
2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition for cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1983); State v. Moore,
424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982);
State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973); see also State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868
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these courts have not recognized the inherently unreliable nature of many prior
inconsistent statements. The unreliable nature of these statements render them
inferior to most other types of admissible hearsay.
IV. THE INFERIOR NATURE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Courts and commentators have yet to recognize the peculiar danger inher-
ent in the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements as compared to other
hearsay exceptions. This previously unarticulated danger lies in the unique the-
ory under which prior inconsistent statements gain admissibility. This section of
the Article will illustrate that prior inconsistent statements gain their substantive
admissibility as a result of a fact that decreases, rather than increases, the prior
statements' reliability.
Every witness is subjected to cross-examination so that the opposing party
will have a fair opportunity to expose the flaws in the witness' perceptual and
narrative abilities, sincerity, and recollection. 60 Absent cross-examination, the
truth of a witness' statement may go unchallenged and the inaccuracies unre-
vealed. A hearsay statement can never be subjected to the same degree of scru-
tiny through cross-examination as can live testimony. 6 1 Thus, the opponent
may never be able to expose, and the trier of fact never learn, the possible relia-
bility problems of a given hearsay statement. This is true even when the declar-
ant takes the witness stand and relates his or her own prior out-of-court
statement.
Although evidence need not be completely reliable to be admissible, the
hearsay rule embodies the belief that out-of-court statements submitted to prove
their truth normally do not rise to a level of trustworthiness sufficient to permit
their admissibility. There are, of course, numerous exceptions 62 to the hearsay
rule.63 These exceptions are based on the teachings of experience or tradition
(1961) (although sustaining a conviction on other grounds, the court implied that prior inconsistent
statements of a witness could serve as a defense).
60. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 726, 728.
61. Cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (quoted with
approval in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that
impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not sub-
ject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility
may be assessed by the jury.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
(expressing constitutional preference for live testimony over hearsay statements). But see United
States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986) (limiting this preference expressed in Roberts to the admission
of former testimony).
62. Professor McCormick has explained the need for exceptions to the hearsay rule as follows:
"[A] problem arises from the wide variation in the reliability of evidence which by definition is
classed as hearsay. The traditional solution has been found in recognition of numerous exceptions
where it has been thought that 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' justified departure
from the general rule excluding hearsay." MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 753.
63. "A number of exceptions have developed over the years to allow admission of hearsay
statements made under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the
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that assertions made under certain circumstances,6 4 or by individuals with cer-
tain interests, 65 are likely to be more reliable than other types of hearsay. State-
ments that fall within a hearsay exception are deemed to reach a level of
trustworthiness sufficient to gain admissibility despite the absence of contempo-
raneous in-court cross-examination.6 6 Underlying each traditional exception
are specific reasons why the otherwise inadmissible, out-of-court assertions are
sufficiently reliable to be permitted into evidence.67
absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
298-99 (1973). As noted by Professor McCormick:
In the late 1700's when confrontation provisions were first included in [the] American bill
of rights, the general rule against hearsay had been accepted in England for a hundred
years, but it was equally well established that hearsay under certain circumstances might
be admitted. A fair appraisal may be that the purpose of the American provision was to
guarantee the maintenance in criminal cases of the hard-won principle of the hearsay rule,
without abandoning the accepted exceptions which had not been questioned as to fairness,
but forbidding especially the practice of using depositions taken in the absence of the
accused.
MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 750.
64. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness:
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil
action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending
death.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
65. "Among the most prevalent of these exceptions is the one applicable to declarations against
interest-an exception founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement
against his own interest at the time it is made." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
66. Of course, there are other hearsay exceptions based on questionable rationales. For exam-
ple, a dying declaration is considered reliable because tradition tells us that no one is likely to want
to risk damnation by dying with a lie on his or her lips. Though dying declarations pose problems of
perception or recollection, these problems are outweighed by the high level of sincerity one is be-
lieved to manifest "in the hush of [death's] impending presence." Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S.
96, 100 (1933). The sufficiency of this type of extrajudicial statement to convict is also a concern of
constitutional dimension but is not addressed in this Article.
67. The pattern of the exceptions as evolved by the decisional process of the common law
and generally in effect today divides the hearsay exceptions into two groups. In the first,
the availability or unavailability of the declarant is not a relevant factor: the exception is
applied without regard to it. In the second group, a showing of unavailability is a condi-
tion precedent to applying the exception. The theory of the first group is that the out-of-
court statement is at least as reliable as would be his testimony in person, so that producing
him would involve pointless delay and inconvenience. The theory of the second group is
that, while it would be preferable to have live testimony, if the declarant is unavailable, the
out-of-court statement will be accepted. The pattern to a large extent is the product of
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Uniquely, there are no such specific reasons that justify the admission of
prior inconsistent statements. These statements are not substantively admissible
because of circumstances that increase their reliability. Rather, it is the declar-
ant's inconsistent present testimony that makes the prior remarks admissible.
However, the prior remarks do not gain increased reliability because of the de-
clarant's present inconsistent testimony. Although it has long been accepted
that a prior inconsistent statement may cast doubt on the veracity of the present
testimony, it is equally true that the present testimony casts doubt on the accu-
racy of the prior inconsistent assertion.
For example, assume that an out-of-court assertion offered into evidence to
prove its truth does not come within the requirements of any hearsay exception.
The hearsay rule dictates that it is inadmissible. The proponent of this otherwise
inadmissible prior statement then calls the declarant as a witness. The declar-
ant, rather than affirming the accuracy of the prior assertion, retracts, contra-
dicts, repudiates, or in some other manner disputes its truth. Absent the present
inconsistent testimony, the prior statement would be inadmissible. Because of
the present inconsistent testimony given under oath, the prior out-of-court state-
ment becomes admissible. The present testimony does not, however, increase
the probability of the prior statement's truth. If anything, the reliability of the
previous assertion is diminished when the declarant disputes its truth. Thus,
this hearsay uniquely gains its admission because of a decrease, not an increase,
in trustworthiness.
In addition, many subtle pressures further diminish the trustworthiness of
prior inconsistent statements below that of assertions admitted under more
traditional hearsay exceptions. Prior inconsistent statements are often made to
police officers or testified to before a grand jury. In either instance a less than
impartial questioner, such as a police investigator or a prosecutor trying to make
his or her case, could maneuver the witness into giving an inaccurate statement.
These statements are rarely given in a neutral and unpressured atmosphere. 68
Furthermore, neither the accused nor his or her representatives are present dur-
history and experience, and, as might be expected of a body of law created by deciding
cases as they arose in necessarily random fashion, it is not in all respects consistent. Never-
theless, it has stood the test of time and use, and offers a substantial measure of
predictability.
MCCORMICK, supra note 20, at 753.
68. For example, the witness-declarant in Green, juvenile Melvin Porter, made his initial state-
ments to the police after several days in custody. See, eg., 4 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN ON EVIDENCE § 801(d)(1)(A)[01], at 801-107 to -108 (1985). The pressures that may be
applied during police interrogation are well known. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
However, the psychological pressures at grand jury proceedings are less publicized. Critics of grand
jury investigations believe that
the psychological pressure felt by the witness stems from.., the "star chamber setting" of
grand jury interrogation. No person stands more alone.., than a witness before a grand
jury; "in a secret hearing, he faces an often hostile prosecutor and 23 strangers, with no
judge present to guard his rights, no lawyer by his side, and often no indication of why he is
being questioned."
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 354 (1985).
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ing a police interrogation or grand jury proceeding.69 Thus, there is no opportu-
nity for cross-examination or qualification in the nature of cross-examination.
Although the defense may succeed in exposing the atmosphere in which the
prior statement was made, the trier of fact may nonetheless choose to believe
that earlier statement. Recognizing these reliability problems, commentators
have suggested that a reasonable jury would rarely convict based solely on a
prior inconsistent statement.70
However, in spite of the low level of trustworthiness possessed by a prior
inconsistent statement, the circumstances under which such a statement is
presented could mislead the average juror into believing that the statement is
reliable and, thus, provide an adequate basis for conviction. If a witness denies
having made the prior statement or admits having made it but now denies its
truth, the trier of fact may perceive its function as having to choose between this
declarant-witness' present testimony and that of another witness who now testi-
fies to the declarant's out-of-court statement. For example, the witness who
testifies to the declarant's out-of-court statement in court is very often a police
officer or the prosecuting attorney. 71 When choosing between a uniformed sym-
bol of law and order who probably has experience testifying in court and an
inconsistent civilian eye-witness who, in many cases, may be implicated in crimi-
nal activity, the jury will "intuitively" credit the prior statement recited by the
officer.72 Similarly, when the prior statement was made at a formal pretrial pro-
69. The presence of the grand jury does little to increase the impartiality of the prosecutor's
questioning.
[T]he notion that a grand jury operates as a significant check on a prosecutor is rather
remarkable. Although the "runaway" grand jury is not unknown in our history, anyone
with any knowledge of our criminal justice system knows that grand juries routinely return
whatever indictment the prosecutor requests. Given the fact that the prosecutor orches-
trates the grand jury proceedings and that no opposing attorneys are allowed to participate
in them, any other result would be surprising.
United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 249 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975) ("The Court of Appeals for this
Circuit has expressed particular concern that an indicting grand jury not become a 'rubber stamp'
endorsing the wishes of a prosecutor as a result of the needless presentation of hearsay testimony in
grand jury proceedings.").
70. "[I]t is doubtful, however, that in any but the most unusual case a prior inconsistent state-
ment alone will ... support a conviction since it is unlikely that a reasonable juror could be con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt by such evidence alone." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 68 § 801(d)(l)(A)[01], at 801-107.
71. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (police officer testified to the witness' prior
extrajudicial remarks and the prosecutor read portions of that witness' preliminary hearing testi-
mony into record); People v. Ford, 30 Cal. 3d 209, 635 P.2d 1176, 178 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1981) (rob-
bery victim having failed to identify positively defendant at trial, prosecutor read transcript of
witness' preliminary hearing identification to jury); People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401,
161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980) (prosecutor introduced evidence of the witness' preliminary hearing testi-
mony); In re Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979) (when assault
victim could not identify defendant, a police officer testified to victim's prior identification at scene of
crime); People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968) (prosecutor read
accusatory grand jury testimony of recanting juvenile victim and her mother when both recanted
their testimony at trial).
72. "[P]olice officers are generally more credible witnesses than prisoners .... " Oregon v.
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1323 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Particularly in a criminal case, the
defendant may have difficulty cross-examining effectively. The attorney may be reluctant to inter-
view the witness before hand because the jury will then get the impression that the witness' story was
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ceeding, such as a grand jury, it will often be the prosecuting attorney, or a court
reporter, who will read, from an official-looking document, the earlier transcrip-
tion into the trial record.73 In either instance, the out-of-court statement gains
increased believability because of its recitation in court by a presumably credible
person representing authority.74 It is unrealistic to rely on jurors75 to develop
an accurate sense of reliability under these circumstances. 76 Jurors may not
understand, or they simply may not care, that the officer, prosecutor, or court
reporter is not attesting to the accuracy of the prior statement, but is testifying
merely that it was made. Further, the jury may draw unreliable inferences from
its mistrust of the declarant's present demeanor. The declarant's demeanor may
have been equally poor at the time he or she made the prior statement, but that
earlier demeanor is safely hidden from the critical eyes of the present trier of
fact. 77 A witness' unsatisfactory trial demeanor should not provide a sufficient
basis to permit conviction solely on that witness' prior unobserved statement. 78
changed as the result of pressure or fear." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 68
§ 801(d)(1)(A)[O1], at 801-108.
73. Cf California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). "By placing the witness on the stand and
reading in the confession, the prosecutor, in effect, increased the reliability of the confession in the
jury's eyes in view of the witness' apparent acquiescence as opposed to repudiation." Id. at 187 n.20
(Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Many variables have been found to be associated with a
person's persuasive impact. Most important among these are: credibility, attractiveness,
and power. People who are perceived to be highly credible, personally attractive, or who
are in a powerful position are usually more persuasive when they deliver a message than
those lacking these characteristics.
Linz & Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the Courtroom, 8 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV.
1, 29 (1984); see, e.g. Hass, Effects of Source Characteristics on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion,
in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION 141 (1981); Kelman, Processes of Opinion Change, 25
Pun. OPINION Q. 57 (1961); McGuire, The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 136, 187-94 (1969).
75. The same rules about the insufficiency of the evidence are equally applicable to judge trials
as well as jury trials. As the Court noted in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.8 (1979): "The
trier of fact in this case was a judge and not a jury. But this is of no constitutional significance."
76. "Hearsay evidence is suspect not merely because it is unreliable, but also because the jury
will not always fully appreciate the unreliability of such evidence. This failure to accurately perceive
and evaluate the evidence may lead to inaccurate factfinding and therefore justifies exclusion."
Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 84
(1984).
77. Whether this problem could be satisfactorily alleviated by the videotaping of the witness'
prior statement is not discussed in this Article. For a general discussion of the videotaping of wit-
nesses, see Goldstein, Using Videotape to Present Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 27 CRIM. L.Q.
369 (1985).
78. See People v. Casillas, 60 Cal. App. 2d 785, 793-94, 141 P.2d 768, 772 (1943). Casillas
involved a nonjury trial of the accused for having engaged in incestuous relations with his daughter.
On direct examination the daughter testified that defendant had performed intercourse with her. On
cross-examination, however, she recanted this direct testimony and stated that it had been her boy-
friend, Manuel, who had really committed the acts in question. Id. at 788-92, 141 P.2d at 769-71.
The prosecution's case rested entirely on the daughter's direct testimony. The trial court found the
accused guilty as charged, stating that it was the court's "personal belief" that the prosecutrix' direct
testimony was the truth. Id. at 793, 141 P.2d at 772. In this case the trier of fact had the opportu-
nity to observe the witness' "demeanor" at the time both inconsistent statements were made.
The court of appeal, however, reversed the conviction:
It is at once apparent that in the personal opinion of the trial judge, the prosecutrix told the
truth only in that part of her testimony wherein she accused her father of the horrible
crimes charged against him. But cases cannot be legally decided upon personal opinions of
those charged with that responsibility, and legal decisions must be made upon a judicial
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However, the witness' unsatisfactory trial demeanor contrasted with the more
credible demeanor of the person relating the witness' prior statement may create
an illusion of unwarranted reliability associated with the earlier statement.79 In
such a situation the trier of fact's decision to believe the unobserved out-of-court
statement rather than the same person's in-court testimony is based on nothing
more than guesswork.8 0 Convictions should be founded on competent evidence
or reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. They should not be founded
solely on unsupported intuition.
V. RECOGNIZING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ADMISSIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the sufficiency of a
prior inconsistent statement to convict. The Court has recognized, however,
that there is a difference between that which the Constitution requires for the
admission of these statements and that which is needed to establish their suffi-
ciency. In California v. Green81 the Court determined that the substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements does not violate the confrontation clause, so
long as the declarant testifies at trial and is available for full and effective cross-
examination. Based on the record before it, however, the Court was unable to
determination based upon legal evidence and recognized rules of law. Neither jurors nor
judges, when acting as arbiters of guilt, are permitted to base their decisions upon the
existence or nonexistence of facts according to their personal beliefs or experiences, but
only upon facts established by legal and competent evidence or upon inferences deducible
from such proven facts as authorized by law. The personal opinion of the judge does not
necessarily reflect the legal opinion of the court. Personal opinion may, and often times
does, disregard law, but judicial determination depends for its accuracy and solidity upon
prescribed principles of law and definite rules of procedure.... Before we could affirm the
judgments of conviction under the state record before us in this case, we would be com-
pelled to completely emasculate the doctrine of reasonable doubt .... In whatever light the
testimony of the prosecutrix is viewed, it must be conceded that her testimony was, in one
part or another, perjurious.
Id. at 793-94, 141 P.2d at 772. The court's analysis could be applied a fortiori to a conviction when a
prior inconsistent statement is the only evidence pointing to guilt. The trier of fact can observe the
witness' demeanor only during recantation and has no basis of comparison with the demeanor at the
time the first statement was made.
79. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
80. But see Circuit Judge Hand's opinion in DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925), in which he stated:
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements in preference to
those made upon the stand is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the
jury see [sic] of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what
he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person
and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accord-
ance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court.
81. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The facts of Green began with the arrest of sixteen-year-old Melvin
Porter for selling marijuana to an undercover agent. A few days after his arrest Porter named Green
as his supplier. Id. at 151. He repeated this identification at a subsequent preliminary hearing.
However, at trial Porter stated that he was uncertain whether Green had supplied him with the
marijuana. He testified that he had been on "acid" (LSD) at the time and that its use had inhibited
his ability to distinguish between fact and fantasy. Id. at 152. As a result, he was unable to remem-
ber the underlying events that had provided the basis of his prior statements. The majority opinion
in Green held the admission of Porter's prior preliminary hearing statements constitutional, id. at
165, and, in dicta, the court added that it saw no constitutional problem with substantively admitting
other statements Porter had made to the police, id. at 170.
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reach the question of sufficiency and remanded to the state court for resolution
of this issue. Writing for the majority, Justice White noted:
[O]n remand... the California Supreme Court may choose to dispose
of the case on other grounds .... [F]or example, because of its ruling
on [admissibility], the California court deliberately put aside the issue
of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction. 82 ... [W]e may
agree that considerations of due process, wholly apart from the Con-
frontation Clause, might prevent convictions where a reliable eviden-
tiary basis is totally lacking .... 83
Lower courts have shown little consistency in their approach to the suffi-
ciency of convictions based solely on prior inconsistent statements.8 4 In United
States v. Orrico85 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit con-
fronted that question. In Orrico the sole evidence against defendant was the
prior grand jury testimony of one witness and the prior written statement of
another.86 At trial neither witness could affirm their prior remarks nor remem-
ber much of the events they had previously described.8 7 The federal court of
appeals interpreted the language in Green as a "strong hint that such statements,
though constitutionally admissible, nevertheless may not be sufficient by them-
selves to sustain a conviction." 88 The Orrico court found:
[S]uch evidence might be sufficient .... given strong indicia of reliabil-
ity and an adequate foundation to establish admissibility. But when
such evidence is the only source of support for the central allegations
of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at all, meet the
minimal requirements of admissibility, we do not believe that a sub-
stantial factual basis as to each element of the crime providing support
for a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been offered by
the Government.8 9
82. Id.
83. Id. at 163-64 n.15.
84. Prior to Green several lower courts had generally held prior inconsistent statements alone
insufficient to convict. At the time of United States v. Schwartz, 390 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968), prior
inconsistent statements were not admissible for their truth. While affirming this traditional rule, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit added that even if such statements had been
admissible to prove their truth, "there is insufficient evidence against defendant." Id. at 7; see also
Eisenberg v. United States, 273 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1959) (prosecution's reliance on witness'
unsworn, out-of-court statement, which she repudiated at trial, was held insufficient to support the
verdict). In Gaddis v. State, 253 Ind. 73, 251 N.E.2d 658 (1969), the only eyewitness to the charged
offense testified at trial that he was not certain that defendant Gaddis was the perpetrator. Id. at 77-
79, 251 N.E.2d at 660-61. However, in the presence of police, approximately one hour after the
commission of the alleged crime, the witness had identified defendant as the culprit. Id. at 75, 251
N.E.2d at 659. The court concluded that in the absence of any circumstantial evidence connecting
defendant to the crime, this prior identification was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 79-
80, 251 N.E.2d at 661-62; see also People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1960) (en banc); infra text accompanying notes 109-16. But see State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868 (Mont.
1961) (prior inconsistent statement sufficient to convict). For a discussion of Mally, see infra note
133.
85. 599 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 116.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 118.
89. Id.
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Interestingly, Orrico is the only federal case since Green to deal with the
sufficiency of prior inconsistent statements to convict. In the absence of consti-
tutional standards dictated by the United States Supreme Court, however, most
state courts have tended to equate sufficiency with admissibility. 90 In Webb v.
State,91 for example, a Florida Court of Appeal failed to distinguish sufficiency
from mere admissibility. The court held the grand jury testimony of the alleged
victim of child molestation sufficient despite the recantation of that testimony at
trial when both the child and her mother denied that the assault had ever taken
place. 92 At trial the child testified that she had lied before the grand jury and
that she had previously confessed the lie to both her teacher and her minister.93
The teacher and the minister confirmed this earlier recantation. 94 The state con-
ceded that, but for the grand jury testimony, the government's case against the
accused would have been insufficient to sustain the conviction. 95 The court,
however, without elaboration, concluded that because the grand jury testimony
was admissible under Florida law,96 the conviction was supported by sufficient
evidence. 97
Similarly, in State v. Igoe9" the North Dakota Supreme Court found the
grand jury testimony of a witness, later denied at trial, enough in and of itself to
sustain the defendant's conviction for the sale of marijuana. 99 The court cited
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1' 0 allowing the admissibility of prior
90. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 59; infra note 130 (discussion of State v. Maestas, 92 N.M.
135, 584 P.2d 182 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978)).
91. 426 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1034.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1033.
96. Id. at 1034.
97. Id. at 1035. In State v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), four alleged
eyewitnesses at one time had identified defendant Moore as having committed a murder; two of these
eyewitnesses had testified against Moore at the grand jury proceedings. Subsequent to defendant's
indictment, however, all four witnesses recanted their prior statements. Id. at 920. In response to a
defense motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment based on the lack of any evidence pointing to
guilt, the State argued that there was sufficient substantive evidence in the form of the now recanted
grand jury testimony. Id. at 92 1. A Florida Court of Appeal agreed that such recanted prior state-
ments were sufficient substantive evidence so that a dismissal of the indictment was not required. Id.
This holding suggests that such evidence may also have been sufficient to sustain a conviction. The
court's decision in Moore, however, may have been influenced by the four eyewitnesses to the crime.
All four had been prostitutes and had worked for defendant, and one was related to defendant.
98. 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973).
99. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court held the prior grand jury testimony sufficient
in Igoe, the court nonetheless reversed the conviction. Defense counsel had relied on a preliminary
trial court ruling that the grand jury testimony would be admissible only for impeachment, not
substantive purposes. This reliance resulted in defendant's decision not to testify in his own behalf.
Id. at 297-98.
100. At the time of the Igoe decision, the North Dakota Evidence Code did not provide for the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. Thus, the state court chose to rely on the
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) as authority for the substantive use of such state-
ments. In 1981 North Dakota enacted a rule 801(d)(l)(A) of its own that provides for the substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements in criminal proceedings so long as the earlier remark was
made while the declarant was under oath. Unlike federal rule 801(d)(1)(A), however, the North
Dakota rule eliminates the oath requirement if the prior statement is offered in a civil proceeding.
N.D. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(i).
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inconsistent statements for their truth, in support of its holding. 1° 1
An even more disturbing case is the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
Gibbons v. State.'0 2 The court in Gibbons upheld a murder conviction based
solely on unsworn prior inconsistent statements allegedly made to a police of-
ficer.' 0 3 Absent the witness' prior inconsistent statements, the state would not
have proved all elements of the crime.a 4 The court, however, concluded that
"[h]ad the State's witness .. . testified as anticipated by the State, all of the
essential elements of proof would have been present."'
10 5
The results in the above cases illustrate the pressing need for a-definite stan-
dard making evidentiary determinations for sufficiency higher than those for
mere admissibility.10 6 To conclude that a piece of evidence is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction simply because it is admissible ignores the quality, or lack
thereof, of that evidence. 10 7 As the Supreme Court noted in Jackson v. Virginia:
Any evidence that is relevant-that has any tendency to make the
existence.., of a crime slightly more probable than it would be with-
out the evidence ... could be deemed [admissible even if it constitutes
only] a "mere modicum" [of evidence]. But it could not seriously be
argued that such a "modicum" of evidence could by itself rationally
support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.10 8
People v. Gould ' 0 9 was one of the first modem cases to recognize the dis-
tinction between admissibility and sufficiency for a witness' prior out-of-court
statement denied at trial. In this case a victim, on several prior occasions, had
identified photographs of Gould and his alleged accomplice, Marudas, as the
two men who had burglarized her home." 0 At the time of trial, however, she
was unable to identify positively either of the two men."' The California
101. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d at 297.
102. 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
103. Id. at 863-64, 286 S.E.2d at 719-20.
104. Id. at 862, 286 S.E.2d at 722.
105. Id. at 862, 286 S.E.2d at 720-21.
106. Professor Stalmack, however, adopted a contrary position when he commented: "To say
that a prior inconsistent statement alone would in all instances be enough to sustain a party's case is
a gross overstatement. This is not an issue that is reductive to a hard and fast rule, but one that
should depend upon the circumstances of each case." See Stalmack, supra note 58, at 267.
107. One student author has commented:
[T]hose states that follow the Supreme Court version of the rule [allowing the substantive
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, even when the prior statement was not made
under oath] very well could convict as happened in Gibbons, on the basis of a framework
whose main, if not sole, support is an unreliable, unsworn statement given to an officer who
investigates the crime.
Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Conflict Between State and Federal Rules of Evidence, 34
MERCER L. REV. 1495, 1520 (1983).
108. 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979).
109. 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960) (en banc). This case predated the
adoption of CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) (the prior inconsistent statements exception to the
hearsay rule) and CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1966) (the prior identification exception to the
hearsay rule.) In Gould Chief Justice Traynor judicially created a prior identification exception to
the hearsay rule without statutory authority. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d at 626, 354 P.2d at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr.
at 275.
110. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d at 625, 354 P.2d at 866, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
111. Id. at 626, 354 P.2d at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
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Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's decision to admit these prior photo-
graphic identifications as substantive evidence.' 12 Consequently, the court held
that Gould, who had previously confessed his involvement in the burglary, 113
had been convicted on sufficient evidence.1 14
The evidence against Marudas, however, was weaker than the evidence
against Gould. Although Marudas, like Gould, had made an apparently incrim-
inating statement, it was insufficient to be considered a confession. When the
police asked Marudas where he had been on the day of the alleged crime, he
responded, "I don't know, but by the time I get to court I will have four or five
people to place me where I want to be."115 Although probably suspicious of
Marudas' meaning, the California Supreme Court nevertheless held that this
statement was insufficient evidence of a consciousness of guilt to connect
Marudas to the crime. 1 6 The court concluded that "[a]n extrajudicial identifi-
cation.., at... trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime."' 117 Given the ab-
sence of any other such evidence, the court overturned Marudas' conviction. 118
Surprisingly, both courts and commentators ignored the sufficiency portion
of the Gould decision for nearly two decades, until the California Supreme Court
again discussed the issue in In re Johnny G. 119 Johnny G. provides an illustra-
tion of an unsworn, uncross-examined prior inconsistent statement that both a
trial judge and an intermediate court of appeal found sufficient to convict.1 20
Johnny was charged in a juvenile superior court with the assault of Carlos
Herrera. 12 1 At the juvenile criminal proceeding Herrera's testimony, through a
Spanish interpreter, tended to exculpate rather than inculpate Johnny.' 22 Her-
rera described two other men as his assailants.1 2 3 Apparently unperturbed by
this testimony, the prosecution chose to call the arresting officer as its only
other witness.1 24 The officer testified that at the scene of the assault he and
112. Id. Gould is most noteworthy for having created a prior identification exception to the
hearsay rule in California. It also provides clear recognition of the distinction between the admissi-
bility and the sufficiency of such statements.
113. Id. at 625, 354 P.2d at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
114. Id. at 630, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
115. Id. at 631, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979) (en bane). While a public defender
for the county of Los Angeles, the author of this Article served as counsel for appellant, Johnny G.,
in both the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court.
120. Id. at 545-46, 601 P.2d at 196-97, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
121. Id. at 545, 601 P.2d at 196, 159 Cal. Rptr at 180.
122. Id. at 545, 601 P.2d at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 181. Although Herrera knew Johnny and had
spoken with him only shortly before the attack, Herrera testified that he did not recognize the voice
of the assailant who had approached him from the rear. Id.
123. Id. Although Herrera could describe his two attackers as Latin males between the ages of
18 and 20, he was unable to recognize either of them. He further testified that one of the assailants
appeared to be somewhat taller than Johnny, while the other was somewhat shorter. Id. Herrera
believed that the two men may have been individuals whom he had passed moments before the
assault, after leaving Johnny's home. Id. at 545-46, 601 P.2d at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
124. Id. at 546, 601 P.2d at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
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Herrera had carried on a brief conversation in English.12 5 He had pointed at
Johnny who was standing nearby and the victim responded affimatively when
asked if that was the man who had struck him.12 6 The trial court admitted this
testimony under the prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay
rule.12 7 On this evidence, the superior court judge found that the prosecution
had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the state court of appeal
affirmed.12 8 The California Supreme Court unanimously reversed, however,
agreeing with the appellant that even if these statements were substantively ad-
missible, they could not alone sustain a conviction.
1 2 9
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966), unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, does not
require the prior inconsistent statement to be made under oath to be admissible. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statement must have been made under oath).
128. Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d at 546, 601 P.2d at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 181. Johnny had also
appealed the admissibility of the out-of-court statements, arguing that the court should have recon-
sidered the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in light of the recent addition of
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 15. Id. That section provides for a California state right to confrontation
independent of the United States Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. In People v. Green, 3 Cal.
3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971), the court had not yet considered the possibility of
deviating from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution's
sixth amendment right to confrontation.
By the time Johnny G. was argued before the California Supreme Court, that court was in the
midst of expanding the California State Constitution's application to criminal procedure. In particu-
lar, the court had used its own State Constitution to provide independent state grounds for finding
unconstitutional procedures that the United States Supreme Court had previously approved. The
California Constitution's confrontation clause could thus have provided an avenue for deviation
from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of confrontation as expressed in United
States v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See In re Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 180 (Mosk, J., concurring). However, the majority in Johnny G. chose not to reach this issue,
but rather chose to find the evidence insufficient to convict. Id. at 546-47, 601 P.2d at 197, 159 Cal.
Rptr. at 181. The California Supreme Court eventually reached this issue in People v. Chavez, 26
Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980), in which the court concluded that, although
the State did have the right to create its own interpretation of admissibility under its state confronta-
tion clause, it would follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation in Green. Id. at 351-
52, 356, 605 P.2d at 411-12, 415, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73, 776.
129. Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d at 548-49, 601 P.2d at 198-99, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 183. In one respect,
Johnny G. is slightly different from the typical case discussed in this Article. In Johnny G. there was
evidence other than the victim's prior inconsistent statement connecting the accused to the crime.
The other evidence alone, however, would have been insufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 548,
601 P.2d at 198, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 182. When the police arrived at the scene, only minutes after the
assault, Johnny was standing just a few feet from the bludgeoned victim. In addition, the victim
testified that just prior to having been struck, he had visited Johnny's home to drop off some laun-
dered clothing and that one of the people who struck him had said something about missing laundry.
Id. at 545, 601 P.2d at 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Can the prior inconsistent statement, when
combined with this otherwise insufficient additional evidence, sustain a conviction? The answer
given by the California Supreme Court in Johnny G. is no. The California Supreme Court concluded
that this additional evidence was not of ponderable legal significance and, therefore, when combined
with the victim's alleged prior inconsistent statement, was insufficient to permit a finding of guilt
against the accused. Id. at 548, 601 P.2d at 198, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
The California Supreme Court's conclusion in Johnny G. is consistent with Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1974). All determinations of sufficiency have to be tested against the Jackson stan-
dard. Courts can often point to some modicum of additional evidence suggesting the accused's
criminal involvement. For example, in People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1960) (en banc), when the accused was asked where he had been at the time the crime had
occurred, he responded, "I don't know, but by the time I get to court I will have four or five people
to place me where I want to be." Id. at 631, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278. This statement
may have raised the California Supreme Court's suspicion as to defendant's criminal involvement,
19861
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Gould and Johnny G., though correct in their results, offer no analysis of
the sufficiency issue. Why was the evidence in each case insufficient? Was the
court implicitly holding that convictions based on prior extrajudicial statements
are a denial of confrontation or of due process 130 encompassing the right to
but, just as in Johnny G., the statement was held insufficient to sustain a conviction even when
combined with the victim's prior identification. See supra text accompanying notes 109-18.
To avoid any potential problem, it is preferable that both the insufficient prior statement and the
otherwise insufficient additional evidence be held to constitute zero proof of guilt: zero plus zero
equals zero. Thus, when the only evidence of guilt, in addition to an otherwise insufficient prior
inconsistent statement, is insufficient, the combination should never justify conviction. At a mini-
mum, there should be a presumption against sufficiency when the additional evidence alone would
have been insufficient. Any rule providing the trial court with greater discretion would be an invita-
tion to base convictions on insignificant evidence and would negate much of the value of a standard
holding prior inconsistent statements, except in unusually trustworthy circumstances, insufficient to
convict.
130. The application of the due process clause to the sufficiency of prior inconsistent statements
has been hinted at by the New Mexico Court of Appeal. In State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d
182 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), the court considered whether the prior inconsistent statements of a com-
plaining witness could provide the sole basis for conviction. Defendant was charged with assaulting
the victim, with whom he lived, and abusing her three-year-old son. The direct examination of the
victim proceeded in part as follows:
Question: Do you know who it was that beat you up?
Answer: I think I do.
Question: Who do you think it was?
Answer: I can't answer it-the question.
The Court: Why can't you tell, or why can't you answer the question?
Answer: It's just too hard to answer, your Honor.
The Court: Do you think you can ever answer the question before this jury?
Answer: No.
Id. at 138, 584 P.2d at 185.
After failing in additional attempts to persuade the complaining witness to describe or identify
her assailant, the prosecution submitted into evidence statements allegedly made by the victim to her
mother, sister, and sister-in-law, identifying defendant as her assailant. Id. at 139, 584 P.2d at 185-
86. These prior statements were held substantively admissible, id. at 142, 584 P.2d at 189, under
New Mexico Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which makes admissible "[a] statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing [hearsay] exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." N.M. R. EvID. 804(b)(6) (1983). The court found "trustworthiness" in the
prior statements having been made within 24 hours of the events described, while the victim's recol-
lections were clear and appeared to have been made in good faith. Maestas, 92 N.M. at 142, 584
P.2d at 189.
The court then considered whether these prior statements could provide the sole basis for de-
fendant's conviction:
[T]he fact that the prior statement is admitted and given substantive effect does not mean
that it will suffice as the sole basis for a conviction. The question of the sufficiency of the
evidence remains, "for the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may require a
minimal standard of evidentiary support to sustain a conviction."
Id. at 145, 584 P.2d at 192 (emphasis added) (quoting with apparent approval 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 68, § 801-76.1).
The court then asked: "Is there sufficient independent or corroborative evidence, circumstantial
in nature, that defendant committed the crime?" Maestas, 92 N.M. at 145, 584 P.2d at 192. The
court answered this question in the affirmative, concluding from "the record as a whole," that
in addition to the prior statements made, the victim lived with the defendant in his home
for a week; that no person bore any unfavorable relationship with the victim that would
lead to a severe beating; that defendant presented no witnesses nor any evidence that
caused doubt upon the truth of the prior statements made; that no evidence of the defend-
ant's good character was presented. These facts and circumstances corroborate the truth
of the prior statements made by the victim. The prior statements made were not the "sole
basis for a conviction."
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conviction based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt?13 1 No such explanation
appears in either case.
VI. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND SUFFICIENCY
Once the United States Supreme Court in California v. Green 132 removed
the confrontation clause as a barrier to the substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements, courts began to sustain convictions based solely on such
evidence.1 33 Do these convictions violate the precepts of confrontation and due
process? The right of cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses is an
element of due process. 134 This section of the Article examines the underlying
rationale for the creation of the confrontation clause and its possible application
through the due process clause to questions of sufficiency.
135
Id.
The court apparently conceded that, absent this additional circumstantial evidence, the prior
statement alone was not sufficient to justify the verdict. Whether this "additional" evidence was in
fact sufficient to justify conviction is itself a close question. See infra note 133.
131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
132. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
133. See United States v. Hines, 18 M.J. 729 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984); People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d
334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980); People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1971); People v. Brown, 150 Cal. App. 3d 968, 198 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1984); Webb v. State,
426 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition for cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1983); Gibbons v.
State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973).
MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) and 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 68,
§ 801(d)(1)(A)[09], at 143, cite State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 608, 366 P.2d 868, 873 (1961), as
authority for the proposition that Montana allows convictions based solely on a prior inconsistent
statement. However, it is arguable that additional substantive evidence supported the prior state-
ment in Mally. In Mally defendant was convicted of manslaughter for negligently failing to obtain
medical care for his injured wife. Defendant's wife, terminally ill with liver and kidney disease, was
left helpless with two fractured arms for a period of two days, while defendant and his brother sat
idly by. Id. at 600-01, 366 P.2d at 869. Reduced to unconsciousness, she was finally taken to a
hospital where she died without ever awakening. The cause of death was diagnosed as a degenera-
tion of the kidneys caused by shock resulting from the untended fractures. Id. At trial defendant's
brother testified that the deceased had refused medical care. This testimony conflicted with the
witness', apparently extrajudicial, earlier statement that defendant had ordered him not to send for a
doctor. Id. at 601, 608, 366 P.2d at 873, 869. Defendant's conviction seemingly rested in part on his
failure to obtain medical aid for his wife. This failure was found to be the proximate cause of her
death. Id. at 610, 366 P.2d at 874. These facts appear to have been substantiated by medical evi-
dence apart from the prior inconsistent statements of defendant's brother. Id.
134. The right to cross-examination is clearly an element of due process. See Smith v. Illinois,
390 U.S. 129 (1968); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934);
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14
n. 14 (1977) (citing Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 969 (1969)).
In essence what the Stoval due process right protects is an evidentiary interest.... Since
the interest protected is in essence an evidentiary one, denial of the retroactive right recog-
nized in Stoval and explicated in Simmons must depend on the assessment of all the factors
and evidence bearing on the identification issue. The presence of other untainted identifica-
tion testimony, counsel's opportunity to inquire into the circumstances of the challenged
identification, and to bring out the facts, are all relevant to the consideration of overall due
process fairness to the accused.
Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Leventhal, J., concurring, in an
opinion joined in by then Circuit Judge Warren Burger), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 969 (1969).
135. Confrontation has often been referred to as an essential feature of the accusatorial, as op-
posed to inquisitorial, justice system. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 39
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The origins of the confrontation clause are somewhat obscure. 136 "The
framers of the Bill of Rights never expressed clearly their intended construction
of this clause, nor are there any early Supreme Court cases interpreting the pro-
vision."1 3 7 It has been suggested, however, that the clause was penned in part as
a reaction to the infamous seventeenth century trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.138
Raleigh was tried, convicted, and eventually beheaded for conspiring with the
enemies of the Crown to overthrow the government of the King of England and
restore Catholicism as the national religion. The government's case against Ra-
leigh was based entirely on two out-of-court statements-the words of an anon-
ymous English gentleman 139 and the confession of a Lord Cobham (made, some
have suggested, under torture).14° A Portuguese pilot testified that an anony-
mous English gentleman told him that the new King "shall never be crowned;
for Don Raleigh and Don Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come."' 141 At
a proceeding at which neither Raleigh nor his representative was present, Lord
Cobham had allegedly confessed his treasonous conduct and named Raleigh as
his accomplice.142 Cobham, who had subsequently repudiated this confession,
was not present at Raleigh's trial.143
Was the creation of the confrontation clause merely a response to the dan-
(1968). Application of due process, apart from the confrontation clause, to convictions based solely
on such evidence is treated in section VII of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 170-81.
136. "[Ihe Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment." California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). "The recorded debates of the House of Represent-
atives indicates [sic] that the confrontation clause was adopted as a part of the Bill of Rights without
debate. The Senate debates from the period are unrecorded." Note, Reconciling the Conflict Be-
tween the Coconspirator Exemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1294, 1301 n.42 (1985) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15-16, 756,
767 (J. Gales ed. 1789)).
137. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 35, at 551.
138. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n.16 (1970) ("It has been suggested that the constitu-
tional provision is based on a common-law principle that had its origin in a reaction to abuses at the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.") (citing F. HELLER, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951)). But see
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4 (1972) ("No one seems to have been able to write about the right
without repeating the claim that the evils of the Raleigh trial led in some way to the Sixth Amend-
ment .... My research gives me no reason to suppose that this custom represents anything other
than a convenient but highly romantic myth, and I adhere to it for this reason.").
139. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381, 388-89
(1959).
140. The confrontation clause is also acknowledged as having been created to prevent what has
been described as the "inquisitional practice of examining witnesses in closed chambers." Lilly,
Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 211-12 (1984).
141. 2 T. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 25 (1809).
142. Id.
143. In response to Raleigh's adamant request for Cobham's presence so that he might question
him, presiding Justice Warburton responded with bewilderment in an argument that may strike a
familiar chord today: "I marvel, Sir Walter, that you being of such experience and wit should stand
on this point; for so many horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned without wit-
nesses." Id. at 18. Raleigh intemperately summed up the crown's case against him: "This is the
saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly priest; what proof is it against me?" See 1 D. JARDINE,
HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 389, 436 (1832). For a more complete account of the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh, see Graham, supra note 138, at 100-01 (Professor Graham gathered his account
from 2 T. HOWELL, supra note 141); 1 D. JARDINE, supra, at 389-511; Pollitt, supra note 139, at
388-89; H. Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, TRANS. ROYAL HIsT. Soc'Y 172 (4th ser.
1919).
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gers of admitting out-of-court statements of questionable reliability into evi-
dence or did it also reflect a concern for the possibility of conviction based solely
on such evidence? 144 It is reasonable to suggest that the framers were concerned
with something beyond the mere evidentiary rules that control the admissibility
of out-of-court statements. Although a prior out-of-court statement may be ad-
mitted under the minimal constitutional standards applied to admissibility, this
does not eliminate the potential unfairness of a conviction when defendants re-
ceive only the most minimal opportunity to confront the "witnesses against"
them.145
Prior to Green it was believed that the confrontation clause precluded the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. After Green the ad-
mission of a prior inconsistent statement satisfies the confrontation clause when
the declarant is available at trial to be subjected to "full and effective cross-
examination."1 46 However, cross-examining witnesses about their prior incon-
sistent statements is of minimal use in detecting the truth. 147 Cross-examination
provides an opportunity to expose effectively only some of the prior statement's
144. Suppose the prosecution calls to the stand the only witness to a crime, and upon in-
quiry he replies that it was John Doe, not the defendant, who killed Cock Robin. Con-
fronted with an earlier statement accusing the defendant, the witness explains that he has
always hated the defendant and accused him in order to cause trouble. On this state of the
record the jury convicts, explaining that it chose to believe the earlier statement rather than
the in-court testimony of the witness. Aha-Catch 22.
If cross-examination, to quote Peggy Lee, "is all there is" to the Sixth Amendment,
then the defendant who has had a procedurally flawless trial has no complaint. Yet unless
the Court is as freaked-out on procedure as some of its critics have suggested, it has to
recognize that there is a converse to that useful concept of "harmless error." Dare we call
it "errorless harm"? I suggest that the confrontation clause, at least in an extended form,
requires the jury faced with such a conflict to prefer the confronted over the unconfronted
statement. In short, there is more to the confrontation requirement than just cross-exami-
nation; it also requires evidence of adequate worth.
Graham, supra note 138, at 137-38. Professor Graham suggests that the confrontation clause must
require more than just cross-examination, implying that a conviction based on a prior inconsistent
statement should be sustained only if there is some evidence of cross-examination of adequate worth.
Id.
145. Today, admission of out-of-court statements of the type used against Raleigh would not be
constitutionally permissible. However, courts have recently validated the constitutionality of admit-
ting at least three forms of previously inadmissible out-of-court statements as substantive evidence.
First, the United States Supreme Court has validated the constitutionality of one jurisdiction's modi-
fication of the hearsay rule's co-conspirator exception in such a way as to open at least the possibility
that statements similar to those in Raleigh's trial might be admitted without violating the confronta-
tion clause. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In Dutton a plurality of the Court validated a
Georgia statute that had expanded that state's co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to in-
clude not only statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy, as traditionally required, but all
statements made by conspirators while attempting to conceal their crime. Id. at 78. Second, when
witnesses have been unavailable at trial, courts have admitted their prior testimony before a grand
jury, a proceeding at which neither the accused nor his or her representatives are permitted to be
present, much less provided with an opportunity to cross-examine. Despite the public perception of
the independent investigative nature of grand juries, close observers report that such proceedings are
generally rubber-stamps for the prosecution. A grand jury that acts independently of the prosecu-
tion gains the title of "runaway" grand jury. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 175 F.
Supp. 198 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 174 F. Supp. 233 (D.N.J. 1959).
Third, the United States Supreme Court will permit the substantive admissibility of a witness' prior
inconsistent statements, even when those prior statements were not made under oath or at a formal
proceeding. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
146. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 40-56.
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reliability problems. 148 For example, it does not effectively prevent the trier of
fact's misplaced reliance solely on a hunch to favor a police officer's recitation of
a prior inconsistent statement over in-court testimony of a declarant-witness
with poor trial demeanor. 149 The potential harm to the effective administration
of justice inherent in this situation is accentuated when the prior statement con-
stitutes the government's entire case. This scenario is rife with the danger of
conviction founded not on reason or fact, but rather on mere intuition.
When the Green Court concluded that the opportunity for effective cross-
examination is the essential element governing the admissibility of prior incon-
sistent statements, the Court implicitly held that there is at least a minimal stan-
dard of fairness inherent in the confrontation clause. The exclusion of evidence
based on a denial of the opportunity to confront is indirectly a rule affecting
sufficiency. When evidence is substantively inadmissible, it can never be used to
sustain a conviction. However, simply because a prior statement is admissible, it
does not necessarily follow that the accused has received a sufficiently fair op-
portunity to confront when the statement constitutes the prosecution's entire
case.
In addition, the original rationale for the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment purposes was to prevent the witness' present testi-
mony from misleading the trier of fact. In many jurisdictions today a party is
not prevented from submitting into evidence the prior inconsistent statements of
his or her own witnesses. 150 When this is the only incriminating evidence the
jury hears, the present testimony is often given at the behest of the prosecution
who uses it merely as the vehicle to introduce the out-of-court version. The
prosecution is not the victim of a defense effort to mislead the jury, but rather is
the author of the entire scenario because it is the prosecutor who submits both
statements into evidence. Neither the search for truth and accuracy nor fairness
to the prosecution require that the jury hear the out-of-court statement in this
context. If anything, these factors require the opposite result.15 1
148. See supra text accompanying note 54.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 71-80.
150. See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 38.
151. Senator Sam Ervin voiced similar concern for the potential of convictions in the absence of
an actual accuser in a debate with Professor Cleary during the Senate committee hearing on the
passage of federal rule 801(d)(1)(A):
Senator Ervin: I would throw this thing on the scrap heap of injustice myself. This
would authorize a conviction of a man who, has no accusor [sic] on the ground that a
witness who says the defendant is not guilty of anything has a poor memory or is a liar.
Professor Cleary: The rule requires, Senator, that the testimony of the witness and his
prior statement be in conflict.
Senator Ervin: Yes, sir.
Professor Cleary: So that the kind of situation that we have presented here is a wit-
ness who has told one story on a former occasion and now at trial tells another story. He is
here; he is in open court; he is under oath; he is subject to cross-examination, and as Judge
Learned Hand said, let the jury find-
Senator Ervin: You have to find beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case that
this man told the truth when he was not sworn but told a lie when he was under oath. I
think that is an affront to the sixth amendment, the Green case, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), to the
contrary notwithstanding. To allow a man to be convicted upon an extra-judicial state-
ment of a third person when you have to find that, at the trial, the third person either had
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Accuracy and fairness both are protected by the due process and confronta-
tion clauses of the Bill of Rights. The confrontation clause was designed to
ensure that criminal defendants would be provided with the opportunity to con-
front the witnesses against them. 152 It would be unfair to convict an individual
absent the opportunity to confront those who claim the individual's guilt. The
means by which a defendant usually challenges adverse witnesses is, of course,
cross-examination. Without cross-examination the defendant is unable to chal-
lenge the accusations of the government's witnesses.1 53
But what does it mean to be a witness against the accused? 154 Not every
prosecution witness can be so labeled. Only those witnesses whose in-court testi-
no memory or was a liar is too dangerous; it is particularly dangerous in crimes that are
serious. I think it denies a fair trial.
I admit the Supreme Court of the United States disagrees with me on that, but I think
I am right and they are wrong.
Professor Cleary: I might point out in connection with your comments, Senator, that
one of the premises which underlies the House rule, although they do not say it, is that
they think that this kind of evidence standing alone ought not to be enough to support a
conviction. Now, if that is so, this is one of the very rare instances in which an item of
evidence, in order to be admissible, has to be sufficient to support a conviction or verdict in
a civil case.
Senator Ervin: In order to be admissible, you have got to prove that the witness either
had no memory or he is a liar when he is placed under oath.
Professor Cleary: In the last or maybe the next to last sentence in the opinion in the
Green case, the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out specifically in connection
with its remand that the Supreme Court of California might wish to consider the question
of sufficiency of the evidence. As a matter of fact, when the case went back, the Supreme
Court of California did examine the evidence, and it looked at all the surrounding circum-
stances, and concluded that there was ample evidence to sustain the conviction. They
reached that conclusion unanimously.
Senator Ervin: My quarrel with the Supreme Court is that they did not hold that
there was a violation of the sixth amendment, which gives the accused in all criminal cases
the right to be confronted by his accusors [sic]. He has no accusor [sic] at all under this
rule.
Professor Cleary: Well, this same question, of course, can be raised in connection with
all hearsay evidence introduced in a criminal case. Mr. Justice Harlan, if you recall, at one
time, and it may have been in the Green case-
Senator Ervin: All exceptions to the hearsay rule that I know anything about are
based upon the probability that the extra-judicial statement was true, and not necessarily
on the basis that the witness is lying when he is under oath.
I do not believe I can convince you and I know you cannot convince me. To me it is
the heart of the rule to say a man has to be confronted by his accusors [sic] in all criminal
cases, and he cannot be convicted when he has no accusor [sic].
J. BAILEY, III & 0. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 51-52 (1980).
152. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 297-98 (1973).
153. "'The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportu-
nity of cross-examination.'" Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5A WIGMORE,
supra note 61, § 1395, at 150).
154. Professor Kenneth Graham has suggested that a person is a witness against the accused if
that person's statements are necessary for the prosecution's case to survive a motion for judgment of
acquittal. See Graham, supra note 138, at 138. Professor Peter Westen has criticized this proposal
by suggesting, inter alia, that it relegates "the right of confrontation to a minor role, because the
prosecution almost always possesses enough 'direct' testimony to survive a motion for acquittal."
Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185, 1188 n.l 1(1979). However, even if
we accept Professor Graham's test for defining "witnesses against" the accused, the test would still
appear to preclude conviction based solely on a witness' prior inconsistent out-of-court statements.
See Graham, supra note 138, at 137 n.185. Professor Westen similarly notes: "To be sure, a defend-
ant cannot be convicted solely upon such evidence. Rather, in addition to such evidence, the state
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mony tends to incriminate the defendant, as opposed to those whose testimony is
favorable to the defense or simply neutral to the case, are truly witnesses against
the accused. Simply because a person was once an accuser does not mean that
that person remains an accuser forever and for all purposes. Although a wit-
ness'prior statement may point to the defendant's guilt, the witness' inconsistent
present testimony may serve to exculpate the defendant.
This analysis is consistent with the majority's holding in California v.
Green.155 In Green, because the government witness in question did not incrimi-
nate the accused, the prosecution was required to use the witness' prior inconsis-
tent statements against Green. In such a situation the "witness against" the
defendant is not the witness presently on the stand giving neutral or exculpatory
testimony. Rather, the "witness against" the accused is the out-of-court declar-
ant. That accuser is presently unavailable as a result of having allegedly
changed his or her story. The prosecution, being unable to offer "live" incrimi-
nating testimony, submits the declarant-witness' out-of-court statements into ev-
idence. The Green Court held that the prosecution successfully met its
obligations "to attempt" to introduce its evidence in the preferred form of live
testimony by calling its witness, Melvin Porter, to the stand. When Porter's live
testimony failed to incriminate Green, the State was forced to resort to the wit-
ness' prior inconsistent statements because the incriminating evidence was un-
available in a better form. 156 Thus, the "live" Porter was, in effect, unavailable
as a "witness against" the defendant. It was the earlier "out-of-court" Porter
who was the "witness against" Green. The memory of Porter's prior statement,
as related in court by another witness to that statement, incriminated the
defendant. 157
The majority opinion in Chambers v. Mississippi 15 8 is consistent with this
definition of "witness against" the accused. The facts of Chambers are the mir-
ror image of the facts of Green. Chambers, charged with killing a police officer,
argued that the killing had in fact been committed by one Gable McDonald. 159
After an unsuccessful attempt to have the court order McDonald called as a
prosecution witness, the defense called McDonald as its own witness and sub-
mitted McDonald's prior sworn written confession to the murder into evi-
dence. 160 On cross-examination by the State, however, the witness professed his
must present such additional evidence as sufficient, when combined with other items, to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Westen, supra, at 1194 n.40.
155. 399 U.S. 149, 164-70 (1970).
156. See Westen, supra note 154, at 1191.
157. This interpretation of "witness against" the accused is consistent with Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Green. Professor WVesten summarized Justice Harlan's concurrence by stating that the
key to Harlan's definition of "witness against.., is a person who is available to give his incriminat-
ing evidence in the form of live testimony in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examina-
tion." Westen, supra note 154, at 1188-89. This definition presupposes that the witness will
incriminate the accused during his or her testimony. Although Justice Harlan repudiated his own
approach to confrontation in his subsequent opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970)
(Harlan, ., concurring), many commentators have chosen to follow Harlan's approach as expressed
in Green, 399 U.S. at 187. See Westen, supra note 154, at 1203 n.72.
158. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
159. Id. at 289.
160. Id. at 291.
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innocence, offered an alibi, and noted his previous repudiation of his earlier con-
fession.1 6 1 On redirect examination, the defense offered several unswom self-
incriminatory statements allegedly made by McDonald to various civilian wit-
nesses. The trial court blocked these defense attempts because they called for
hearsay and also involved an attempt by Chambers, not permitted under state
law, to impeach his own witness. 162 Before the United States Supreme Court,
Mississippi sought to justify the trial court's decision by arguing that the witness
McDonald was not "adverse" to Chambers and, therefore, not a "witness
against" the accused within the meaning of the confrontation clause.1 63 The
State argued that the constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses was not
implicated because McDonald did not "point the finger" at Chambers. 1 " On
this point the Supreme Court concluded that the "availability of the right to
confront and to cross-examine those who give damaging testimony against the
accused" could not constitutionally be controlled by a "narrow and unrealistic
definition of the word 'against.' "165 The Court noted:
[T]he State's proof at trial excluded the theory that more than one
person participated in the shooting.... To the extent that McDonald's
confession tended to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate
Chambers. And, in the circumstances of this case, McDonald's retrac-
tion inculpated Chambers to the same extent that it exculpated Mc-
Donald. It can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in
fact seriously adverse to Chambers. 166
Thus, the Court viewed McDonald's in-court testimony as "against" the ac-
cused, and his prior out-of-court inconsistent statements as favorable to the
accused.
In the typical prior inconsistent statement situation discussed in this Article
and exemplified by Green, the prosecution calls the witness to the stand. The
witness then gives testimony that is neutral or even favorable to the defense.
The same witness also has previously made out-of-court statements that are
favorable to the prosecution and adverse to the defense. The prosecution is then
permitted to submit those prior statements into evidence in its case in chief. By
analogy to Chambers, the witness' present testimony in this situation is not
"against" the defendant but rather is "against" the State. Thus, it is the witness'
prior inconsistent statement, as submitted by the State, that is truly "against"
the accused; it is this out-of-court statement that the accused must be given an
opportunity to confront adequately, and yet it is this "witness" who is not really
present.
As illustrated above, when the prosecution's witness does not affirm the
truth of his or her prior statements, cross-examination can only emphasize the
differences between those out-of-court statements and the witness' present testi-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 292-93.
163. Id. at 291-92, 297.
164. Id. at 292, 297.
165. Id. at 297-98.
166. Id. at 297.
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mony in what will probably be an ineffectual attempt to convince the jury to
favor the in-court testimony. 167 Furthermore, because the defendant may agree
with the witness' present in-court testimony, defense counsel can hardly proceed
to cross-examine with the ferocity of typical cross-examination. The defend-
ant's goal is not to attack the witness' present reliability, but rather to attack
that witness' credibility on a prior unobserved occasion. Without an adverse
witness, cross-examination loses much of its character and effectiveness.
Although the Green Court found that noncontemporaneous cross-examination
is sufficient to allow admission of a prior inconsistent statement without doing
violence to the confrontation clause, 168 the Court was careful not to hold a prior
inconsistent statement sufficient to convict under the due process clause.1 69
Thus, the goals of fairness and accuracy inherent in the confrontation and
due process clauses mandate that a prior inconsistent statement is sufficient to
convict only if the accused has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at
the time the prior statement was made or when the declarant was still affirming
its truth. Only under these circumstances can confrontation and cross-examina-
tion be meaningful for the defense. If the standard for effective cross-examina-
tion is not higher for sufficiency than for admissibility, Sir Walter Raleigh's trial
may soon have contemporary counterparts.
VII. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND SUFFICIENCY
The Court in California v. Green 170 noted that aside from the confrontation
clause considerations, the due process clause might prevent convictions when
there is no evidence other than the prior inconsistent statement. 17 1 This is a
recognition of the long-established principle that due process prohibits convic-
tion on evidence that is insufficient to prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt.172 A quarter of a century before Green, the Court in Bridges v. Wixon 173
held that a government witness' prior unsigned, unsworn statements were sub-
stantively inadmissible. The Supreme Court expressed the fear that to admit
such evidence "would allow men to be convicted on unsworn testimony of wit-
nesses-a practice which runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our
legal system is founded." 174 Although this type of out-of-court statement may
be substantively admissible today, the same "notions of fairness" discussed in
Bridges should preclude conviction based on it alone.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence can violate due process in one of
167. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
168. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
169. Id. at 153.
170. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
171. Id. at 163 n.15, 170.
172. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.").
173. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
174. Id. at 153-54.
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two ways. First, when the evidence is quantitatively insufficient, even if reliable,
it is not enough to lead a "reasonable" trier of fact to conclude that the defend-
ant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1 75 Second, when the evidence is quali-
tatively insufficient it is so unreliable that a conviction based solely on it would
deny the defendant a fair trial.176 The evidence in this second category, if relia-
ble, would be quantitatively sufficient to prove the elements of the case beyond a
reasonable doubt; it is the unreliability of the evidence that violates due process.
Conviction based solely on a prior inconsistent statement falls in the second
category. Testimony's reliability is determined in part by the ability of the de-
fendant to cross-examine and thereby test the credibility of the witness. 177 As
discussed earlier, absent the ability to cross-examine the declarant at the time
the prior statement was made or at a time when the declarant was still affirming
the statement's truth, cross-examination is severely limited and the trustworthi-
ness of the statement is questionable. 178 If the only evidence against the accused
is of highly questionable reliability, then conviction could be an inaccurate re-
sult. As demonstrated above, the possible effectiveness of defense counsel's
cross-examination to reveal the unreliability of prior inconsistent statements is
minimal. It is minimal because cross-examining a witness who has already re-
canted the very statement defense counsel seeks to attack is problematic.
The Supreme Court could not have been unmindful of this problem. The
Court in Green recognized that the level of required effectiveness varies with the
stakes. 179 Although cross-examination in a case like Green is potentially effec-
tive enough to justify admissibility, a much higher level of effectiveness must be
required when the entire case turns on the prior inconsistent statement. To con-
vict solely on an unconfronted, out-of-court statement that the declarant has
now repudiated, recanted, or forgotten is to convict without due process of law.
A conviction may, of course, be based solely on the testimony of one of
several conflicting witnesses. This differs, however, from a conviction that rests
solely on a trier of fact's choice to believe the out-of-court assertion of a declar-
ant who is now in court and testifying inconsistently with his or her prior state-
ment. In some situations it would be reasonable for a trier of fact to find the
prior out-of-court statement the more reliable and accurate account of the event
described. For example, the trial record could reveal a reasonable factual basis
of ponderable legal significance °8 0 from which a trier of fact could legitimately
175. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Thomp-
son v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
176. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1976); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Sim-
mons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Turner v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). Justice Harlan in Green "recognized
that evidence of identification-always a critical issue in a criminal trial-should not be received if
the circumstances of a pretrial confrontation were so infected by suggestiveness as to give rise to an
irreparable likelihood of misidentification." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
177. See supra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
179. Green, 399 U.S. at 170.
180. "The determination of the degree of a crime is, of course, generally left to the discre-
tion of the jury. Upon appeal, the reviewing court is bound to view the evidence most
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infer that the prior statement is the more accurate account. If so, the due pro-
cess goals of reliability and accuracy would be sufficiently met. However, with-
out a specific factual basis in the record to justify believing the prior accusation
over the present testimony, a verdict based solely on the prior statement would
be supported only by suspicion, hunch, guess, or intuition. A verdict based on
intuition is not founded in fact or reason and does not satisfy due process.1 8 1
VIII. PROPOSED SUFFICIENCY STANDARD
Concerned with the possibility of conviction based solely on a prior incon-
sistent statement, Justice Harlan, concurring in California v. Green,182 suggested
that he "would not permit a conviction to stand where the critical issues at trial
were supported only by ex parte testimony not subjected to cross-examination,
and not found to be reliable by the trial judge." 183 Justice Harlan would have
thus required both an opportunity to cross-examine and a judicial determination
of reliability.
Justice Harlan's requirement of cross-examination can be met in two ways.
First, the prior statement could have been subject to cross-examination at the
time it was made. When combined with sufficient other indicia of reliability, this
would provide an adequate constitutional safeguard. Second, Justice Harlan ap-
parently would have been satisfied if the declarant, although not subject to cross-
examination at the time the prior statement was made, is present in court and
questioned concerning the out-of-court remarks. This second situation, how-
ever, is not the true equivalent of the first. As discussed earlier in this Article, 184
the quality of cross-examination possible of a witness' prior inconsistent state-
favorably in support of its judgment. ... But the jury's discretion is not absolute....
'Implicit in our duty to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict is our
obligation, in a proper case, to appraise the sufficiency'" ..... [I]t is not enough for the
respondent simply to point to "some" evidence supporting the finding .... "The critical
word in the definition is 'substantial'; it is a door which can lead as readily to abuse as to
practical or enlightened justice." . . . [Tihe term "clearly implies that such evidence must
be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous
with 'any' evidence. It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must
actually be 'substantial' proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case."
... In resolving that contention the appellate court is required to determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of prov-
ing the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.. . . Accordingly, in determining
whether the record is sufficient in this respect the appellate court can give credit only to
"substantial" evidence, i.e., evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is "of solid
value".... [T]his test has perhaps most frequently been invoked in holding insufficient the
evidence of identity purporting to connect the defendant with the crime ....
People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 137-39, 443 P.2d 777, 786-88, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 202-04 (1968)
(citations omitted).
181. A verdict not founded on fact or reason violates the principles laid down in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
182. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
183. Green, 399 U.S. at 186 n.20 (Harlan, J., concurring). "It will, of course, be the unusual
situation where the prosecution's entire case is built upon hearsay testimony of an unreliable witness.
In such [a] circumstance the defendant would be entitled to a hearing on the reliability of the testi-
mony." Id. After reviewing many of the recent cases discussed in this Article, the reader may
choose to question Justice Harlan's belief that only in the "unusual" situation will the prosecution's
entire case be based on the hearsay testimony of an unreliable witness.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 40-58.
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ment is radically different than that possible of a witness' present testimony. 185
Absent the opportunity to cross-examine contemporaneously, a defendant may
not receive sufficient confrontation to permit conviction based solely on such
evidence. 186
Justice Harlan's additional requirement that the out-of-court assertion be
judged reliable before it can be held sufficient, 187 though a valid concern, does
not alone eliminate the problem. 188 It leaves unanswered the question of what
standard should be applied in determining reliability. 189 Given the constitu-
185. For elaboration of the difficulty in questioning a witness about the witness' prior statements,
see supra text accompanying note 54.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14, 57-59, 134-81.
187. The recent military case of United States v. Hines, 18 M.J. 729 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), allowed
a conviction based partially on signed, prior out-of-court statements. In a prosecution for defend-
ant's alleged assaults on his stepdaughters, the two alleged victims and their mother honored sub-
poenas to appear at trial, but refused to testify. Id. at 730. The court martial permitted the use of
typed sworn statements signed by the mother and two children describing the defendant's criminal
conduct, under MIL. R. EVID. § 804(b)(5). The court found these prior statements sufficient to
support a finding of guilt. Id. at 744. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient because
the defense had not submitted evidence to contradict the inculpatory statements in question. Id. at
743-44.
Hines appears to run contrary to many of the reasons that the courts and commentators have
traditionally given for the creation of the rules against hearsay and the confrontation clause. In
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), the Court held that "[the primary object of the
[confrontation clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits.., being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness .... " Id. at 242. In
Hines defendant was convicted despite the refusal of the only witnesses against him to testify at trial.
These witnesses' prior out-of-court signed statements were the sole evidence used to convict defend-
ant on five of the six specifications.
The problem with a conviction based on such evidence was recognized in Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965). In Douglas the Court held that a defendant's inability to cross-examine a
prosecution witness who had refused to testify precluded, as violative of the confrontation clause, the
substantive use of that witness' prior extrajudicial statement. Id. at 419-20. Placing the burden on
the defendant to contradict statements he or she is unable to cross-examine because of a witness'
refusal to testify violates this same principle. However, the confrontation clause provided little ob-
stacle to the Hines court when it held the evidence both admissible and sufficient to convict.
188. In search of a workable standard for determining sufficiency, one commentator has sug-
gested a requirement of corroboration:
[A] court could examine the record for any circumstantial or direct evidence presented in
support of the prior inconsistent statement to sustain the verdict .... [A] court could
consider such factors as whether the prior inconsistent statement was given under oath at
some kind of formal proceeding or whether the statement was written, signed, recorded, or
acknowledged by the witness.
Stalmack, supra note 58, at 269-70.
This requirement appears to be a viable test for determining admissibility, but not for determin-
ing sufficiency. For example, the latter point, which suggests that a signature or acknowledgment of
the statement might increase the prior statement's trustworthiness, obscures the difference between
the two separate issues that arise every time a prior inconsistent statement is admitted into evidence.
The proponent of such evidence, as with all hearsay statements, must convince the trier of fact both
that the out-of-court statement was made by the declarant and that it should be believed. The
signing or acknowledgement of the prior statement is one additional factor increasing the likelihood
that the prior statement was made by the declarant. However, this adds little to the trier of fact's
ability to determine whether the prior statement was an accurate account of the event it attempted to
describe. Traditionally, cross-examination is the manner in which the reliability of statements is
tested.
189. Professor Blakey notes that in the absence of specific standards to determine whether a
particular prior inconsistent statement alone is sufficient to convict, lower courts have been allowed
great discretion. Blakey, supra note 57, at 23. In particular, Professor Blakey points to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1971). This was an opinion rendered after the United States Supreme Court returned California v.
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tional rights at stake and the inherent untrustworthiness of such evidence, a
clear and definite standard is needed to determine what constitutes sufficient
reliability.
What is needed is a sufficiency guideline that requires both contemporane-
ous cross-examination and a specific test for determining reliability. The goals
of accuracy and fairness that underlie confrontation and due process can be met
by the following standard: A conviction can be based solely on a prior inconsis-
tent statement only if the statement was subject to cross-examination by the
defendant at the time it was made, or when the witness was affirming its truth,
and there is some reasonable factual basis appearing in the record to credit the
prior statement over the present in-court testimony. Two California cases illus-
trate the application and workability of this standard.
In People v. Chavez 190 a member of an East Los Angeles street gang, the
"L.A. Clovers," was charged with having fired rifle shots at members of a rival
gang, the "Hazards." 19 1 The only evidence submitted to establish Chavez's
guilt as the "shooter" was the prior inconsistent statements of a member of the
"Hazards," Gregory Angel.' 92 Angel had identified Chavez to the police and
subsequently confirmed his extrajudicial identification at a pretrial preliminary
hearing.193 At trial, however, Angel denied having seen the person who fired
the shots. 194 The pretrial statements were admitted into evidence and Chavez
was convicted.195
The California Supreme Court agreed that the prior statements Angel made
to the police officers were analogous to those held insufficient in In re Johnny
G. 196 However, in Chavez, unlike in Johnny G., the witness' positive identifica-
tion had been repeated under oath and while subject to cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing. This "sworn testimony at a formal, judicially-conducted
preliminary examination clearly provides a more substantial basis ... than the
extrajudicial identification in Gould, [and in] Johnny G. . .. 197
Furthermore, in Chavez there was an explanation for the witness' inconsis-
tent trial testimony. As the California Supreme Court noted, Angel had from
the beginning indicated his unwillingness to testify in court because no one had
been hurt by the shooting. On the witness stand, "Angel forthrightly conceded
that he had told the district attorney just a few days before the trial that he did
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), to the state court for consideration of issues left undecided. The Califor-
nia court's decision in People v. Green suggested that future convictions based solely on a prior
inconsistent statement were to be allowed only if the trial judge believes the prior inconsistent state-
ment to be true. This decision to leave almost complete discretion in the trial court, Professor
Blakey concludes, "provides no real protection against convictions based solely upon prior inconsis-
tent statements." Blakey, supra note 57, at 23-24.
190. 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980).
191. Id. at 339, 605 P.2d at 404, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
192. Id. at 342, 605 P.2d at 406, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
193. Id. at 342-43, 605 P.2d at 406, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
194. Id. at 342, 605 P.2d at 406, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
195. Id. at 351, 605 P.2d at 411, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
196. 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979) (en banc).
197. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d at 364, 605 P.2d at 420, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
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not want to testify because he felt that the whole matter 'should be settled in the
streets' rather than in court." 1 98
In addition, the court noted that the defense had failed to discredit Angel's
identification when given an opportunity to cross-examine him at the prelimi-
nary hearing. 199 Thus, the court was properly concerned with finding an expla-
nation for the inconsistencies between the witness' preliminary hearing
testimony and his recantation at trial. Given Angel's statements to the District
Attorney and his testimony at trial, it was clear that the witness had changed his
version of the story because he wanted the dispute to be settled in a different
forum, and not because the prior statements were inaccurate. Angel's recanta-
tion of his preliminary hearing identification did not denigrate the veracity of
that prior identification. The court's decision to find the evidence in Chavez
sufficient was correct because the prior statement was subject to cross-examina-
tion at the time it was made and there was sufficient evidence in the record, the
witness' stated reason for his reluctance to testify, for a reasonable trier of fact to
credit the reliability of the prior statement over that of the in-court testimony.
Similarly, in People v. Ford20 0 the California Supreme Court sustained a
conviction for robbery based solely on the prior inconsistent statement of the
victim merchant who had been the sole witness to the crime.20 1 Although the
victim had positively identified Ford to the police and later at a pretrial prelimi-
198. Id.
199. Id. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court in In re Miguel L., 32 Cal. 3d 100, 649
P.2d 703, 185 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1982), suggested in dicta that when a conviction is based solely on a
prior inconsistent statement, it "may stand if the extrajudicial statement was reiterated by the wit-
ness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceeding, and there was evidence
from which the factfinder could credit the witness's prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm
the extrajudicial statements at trial." Id. at 106, 649 P.2d at 706, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
To date, even California's lower courts have refused to follow this dicta. In People v. Brown,
150 Cal. App. 3d 968, 198 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1984), for example, the California Court of Appeal ig-
nored the language of Miguel L.
In Brown the only evidence of defendant's guilt of grand theft was an eyewitness' alleged prior
statements made during a police interview and subsequently repudiated by that witness at the pre-
trial preliminary hearing. Id. at 971, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62. At trial the witness continued to
deny any knowledge of defendant Brown's involvement in the crime and testified that she in fact had
never identified him to the police. Id. The state court of appeal found that the circumstances gave
sufficient reliability to the prior statements made to the police and that a conviction could be based
solely on them. In doing so, the court of appeal limited Miguel L., concluding that it was merely an
application of CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 1954), a statute which provides that the testimony of
an accomplice is never alone sufficient to convict. Id. at 972, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 262. The Brown
court's explanation of the real meaning of Miguel L. is particularly questionable because it is well-
established under California law that CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 is inapplicable to juvenile cases, and
MiguelL. was a juvenile case. See In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144, 151 Cal. Rptr.
330 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979); In re Frederick G., 96 Cal. App. 3d 353, 157 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 934 (1980); In re R.C., 39 Cal. App. 3d 887, 114 Cal. Rptr. 735
(1974).
Failing to even cite In re Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979) (en
banc), the Brown court sustained the conviction apparently without concern that to do so was con-
trary to the clear dictates of the California Supreme Court in Miguel L Even if the prior statements
in Brown had been made under circumstances suggesting that they could be believed over the incon-
sistent trial testimony, the witness' earlier remarks were not made at any formal judicial proceeding,
nor taken under oath or subjected to cross-examination. The reliability surrounding the prior state-
ment should be a relevant factor only when the prior statement was made at a judicial proceeding.
200. 30 Cal. 3d 209, 635 P.2d 1176, 178 Cal. Rptr. 196, cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1981).
201. Id. at 212, 635 P.2d at 1177, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
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nary hearing, he could not affirm his identification while testifying at trial.20 2 In
fact, during trial he testified that he had never been completely certain that Ford
was the man who had robbed him20 3 and added that he had identified defendant
at the preliminary hearing because the presiding municipal court magistrate had
told him that he "had" to make a decision.2° 4 After reviewing the preliminary
hearing transcript, however, the state supreme court concluded that the witness
had not been coerced into the earlier identification. 20 5 In addition, the court
found substantial internal inconsistencies in the witness' trial testimony.20 6
These circumstances, combined with evidence of a pretrial meeting between the
witness and the accused, gave the jury a reasonable factual basis to elevate the
untainted preliminary hearing testimony above the reasonably discredited trial
testimony. Thus, the court, as it had in Chavez, found the witness' prior state-
ment sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The court in Ford, however, went on to note that even if the witness' "ex-
planation of his testimony at the preliminary hearing had been plausible, the
jury was not bound to believe it and disbelieve his prior testimony: inconsisten-
cies in identification evidence are for the jury to resolve." 20 7 The court added
that the prior inconsistent identifications made in People v. Gould 20 8 and In re
Johnny G. 20 9 were insufficient to sustain convictions because both had been
made "in circumstances that cast serious doubt on their accuracy and trustwor-
thiness."' 210 In Ford the prior identification "was made in a formal judicial pro-
ceeding, under oath and subject to cross-examination. 21 1 This, the court
202. Id. at 212-13, 635 P.2d at 1177, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
203. Id. at 214, 635 P.2d at 1178, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. To begin with, in the circumstances of this case the repudiation itself provided the jury
with a basis on which it could have discredited Lane's trial testimony in favor of his prelim-
inary hearing testimony. Lane gave two different explanations of the latter testimony, and
each could have aroused the jury's suspicions. First, under questioning by the court Lane
claimed he positively identified defendant at the preliminary hearing only "Because the
judge told me I had to make a definite decision. She said I couldn't say 'looked like,' I had
to say yes or no. In my mind I wasn't completely decided whether that was the man or
not." Second, under cross-examination by defense counsel Lane denied he had identified
defendant as the man who had robbed him, and claimed he meant only to say that defend-
ant resembled the police photograph he had previously selected. But not only did these
claims seen inconsistent with each other, they were apparently refuted by the transcript of
the preliminary hearing read to the jury: from that transcript the jury could have found
that the magistrate did not in fact coerce Lane into making a positive identification against
his will, and that the identification was not in fact based on the photograph of defendant
but on Lane's recollection of the actual events "at the time of the robbery." And from
these findings, the jury could well have inferred, as in Chavez, that the reason for the
witness's failure to make a positive identification at trial was simply that in the interim he
had become reluctant to testify against this defendant. Indeed, the evidence reveals that
defendant and his wife had a discussion with the witness prior to trial.
Id. at 214-15, 635 P.2d at 1178-79, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
207. Id. at 215, 635 P.2d at 1179, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 109-18.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
210. Ford, 30 Cal. 3d at 215, 635 P.2d at 1179, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
211. Id.
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stated, was sufficient evidence of reliability to support a conviction. 2 12
These comments by the court are disturbing and based on questionable rea-
soning. Triers of fact are permitted to choose between the conflicting testimony
of separate witnesses. To allow a conviction based solely on a choice between
conflicting statements by the same witness, however, is a different matter. Is the
opportunity to confront the witness at the pretrial hearing enough alone to sat-
isfy both confrontation and due process? When, as in Ford, the prior statement
was made in a formal proceeding, under oath and subject to cross-examination,
it is arguable that the accused has been given all the safeguards demanded by the
confrontation clause. Ford, for example, was provided with an opportunity to
confront the "witness against" him at a time when that witness alleged Ford's
criminal complicity. The due process clause, however, remains unsatisfied in
this situation. Unless the trial record reveals some reasonable factual basis to
credit the prior unobserved statement over the same witness' present testimony,
a conviction based solely on such a statement is mere guess work or intuition.2 13
The California Supreme Court in Ford would not only leave triers of fact free to
disbelieve the sworn statement made in their presence and to accept as true a
statement made by the same witness out of their presence, but would also allow
convictions to stand although based solely on this decision.214
Arbiters of guilt should not be permitted to find proof beyond a reasonable
doubt based on such a record. Even former testimony may be insufficient to
convict, particularly when the declarant now testifies, under oath and subject to
cross-examination, in a manner inconsistent with those prior statements and
which, if believed, would result in an acquittal. Absent a reasonable factual
basis to credit the prior statement over the present testimony, neither judge nor
jury should be permitted to convict solely on their intuition that a witness is now
lying under oath, but was sincere when the earlier statements were made.
212. Id. The California Supreme Court's standard, proposed by way of dicta in Ford, is that if
the prior statements were made under some circumstances not clearly devoid of any indicia of relia-
bility, they are sufficient to support a conviction. This standard, however, is similar to that required
for mere admissibility. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
held that for a hearsay statement to be admitted without violating the confrontation clause, it must
have been made under circumstances possessing "indicia of reliability." Id. at 66; see also supra note
129 (discussion of prior inconsistent statements combined with otherwise insufficient additional evi-
dence). Therefore, when the California court notes that the prior statement will not be sufficient to
convict if made under untrustworthy circumstances, it is only stating the obvious, because an un-
trustworthy statement should not even be admissible under the confrontation clause. When the
prior statement was made at a proceeding in which there was an opportunity for the defendant to
cross-examine the witness, Roberts provides that there is sufficient confrontation so that the testi-
mony will be admissible at the defendant's subsequent trial. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73. Thus, the
statements in Ford and Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980), were both
constitutionally admissible. However, simply because the statements were admissible does not mean
that they were automatically sufficient to convict. Even when the prior statement was made with
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to gain admissibility, a higher standard should be required
for sufficiency.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80, 178-81.
214. When the prior inconsistent statement provides the sole basis for conviction, the California
Supreme Court has concluded that the conviction will not be overturned unless the record reveals
that the prior statement was made under untrustworthy circumstances. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 207-12; note 212.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Once prior inconsistent statements became substantively admissible, the
spectre of conviction based solely on such statements became a reality. Several
jurisdictions today permit conviction based solely on prior inconsistent state-
ments without clearly articulated concern for the constitutional rights that such
convictions may violate. The meanings of the due process and confrontation
clauses of the United States Constitution should not fluctuate depending on the
jurisdiction in which a case is tried. A definite national standard must be estab-
lished. The potentially low level of reliability unique to prior inconsistent state-
ments demands that safeguards be established to ensure that a defendant can be
convicted only when there is a fair opportunity for the defendant to confront
adverse witnesses and there is reliable evidence pointing to guilt. The standard
suggested in this Article, that the prior inconsistent statement must be made at a
time when the declarant was subject to some form of cross-examination by the
defendant and that there must be a reasonable factual basis in the record for a
trier of fact to credit the prior statement over the present in-court testimony,
would avoid the dangers inherent in conviction based solely on prior inconsis-
tent statements.
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APPENDIX
Section I
Currently 15 states have adopted FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) virtually
verbatim: FLA. STAT. ANN. 90.801(2)(a) (West 1979); IDAHO R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); IOWA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); ME. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) ; MINN.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-801, Rule 801(4)(a)(i) (1975);
N.H. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A, Rule 63(l)(a) (West
Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(1) (West 1978); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 40.450, Rule 801(4)(a)(A) (1984); S.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1); TEX. R.
EVID. 801(e)(1)(A); VT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i);
W. VA. CODE R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Another 6 states follow the Federal Rule with some modifications. HA-
WAII R. EvID. 802.1(1) is comparable to the Federal Rule, but reorganizes a
number of the provisions. The Hawaii rule provides for the substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements as an exception to the hearsay rule, rather than as
an exemption from the hearsay rule. The Hawaii rules also provide that the
prior statement, even if not made under oath, can still be substantively admitted
if it was
(B) Reduced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by the declarant; or
(C) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously with the
making of the statement ....
Id. 802.1(1)(B), (C).
The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure substantively admits prior incon-
sistent statements in criminal but not civil cases when the prior statement was
either made under oath or, though not made under oath, it is a statement that
narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the wit-
ness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by
the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the
statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the
admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by
a tape recorder, videotape, recording, or any other similar electronic
means of sound recording.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). Massa-
chusetts, which has traditionally followed the orthodox rule, has proposed Rules
of Evidence that would incorporate verbatim FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A).
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court has declined to adopt these Pro-
posed Rules as a whole, it has invited parties to cite the rules in their briefs
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before the court. Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 66, 469 N.E.2d 483,
491 (1984). In one case the Massachusetts high court held
a prior inconsistent statement is admissible as probative if made under
oath before a grand jury, provided the witness can be effectively cross-
examined as to the accuracy of the statement, the statement was not
coerced and was more than a mere confirmation or denial of an allega-
tion by the interrogator, and other evidence, tending to prove the issue
is presented.
Id. at 69, 469 N.E.2d at 495-96; see also N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i) (oath re-
quired in criminal but not civil proceeding). OHIO R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(a) specif-
ically requires that the declarant's statement must have been made under oath
and "subject to cross-examination by the party against whom the statement is
offered." Id. This additional requirement would prohibit the use of a prior in-
consistent statement as substantive evidence, for example, in a grand jury pro-
ceeding against a criminal defendant, because this testimony would not be cross-
examined. However, a witness' prior statement "of identification of a person
soon after perceiving him" is substantively admissible "if the (c) circumstances
demonstrate the reliability of the prior identification," even if the prior state-
ment was not made under oath and subject to cross-examination at the time it
was made. Id. 801(D)(1)(C). Wyo. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) is identical to the
Federal Rule but limits substantive admissibility to criminal proceedings.
Section II
A total of 19 states provide, either by statute or case law, for the substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements but have omitted the requirement of the
Federal Rule that the prior statement be given under oath-some of these states
require other reliability ensuring safeguards. The 19 states are: ALASKA R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 92-93 (Alaska 1971); Van
Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047, 1049-50 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); ARIZ. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); State v. Cruz, 128 Ariz. 538, 540, 627 P.2d 689, 691 (1981); State
v. Acree, 121 Ariz. 94, 97, 588 P.2d 836, 839 (1978); ARK. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i)
(no oath requirement except if offered in a criminal proceeding); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1235 (West 1966); COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); People v. Mulligan,
193 Colo. 509, 517, 568 P.2d 449, 455-56 (1977); State v. Whelan, 513 A.2d 86,
92, 200 Conn. 743, 753-54 (1986) (prior signed written inconsistent statement
admissible as substantive evidence when declarant testifies at trial based upon
personal knowledge and is subject to cross-examination); DEL. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862-63, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982);
Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 57, 324 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1975) (prior statements
were admissible where "neither [witness] denied giving the statements attributed
to her, nor did either profess ignorance of such statements"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(a) (1982) (allowing for the substantive admission of all prior statements
made by persons "present at the hearing and available for cross-examination
with respect to the statement," including the prior inconsistent statements of a
witness); State v. Holt, 228 Kan. 16, 21-22, 612 P.2d 570, 576 (1980); Jett v.
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Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788, 792 (Ky. 1969); MICH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)
(The Michigan Evidence Code fails to provide for an exception for prior incon-
sistent statements. However, rule 801(d)(1) does provide for the admissibility of
prior identifications when the identifying party is now on the stand for cross-
examination. This exception appears to permit the introduction of prior identifi-
cations into evidence even when the witness either fails to confirm or recants the
original identification at trial. This would allow such prior inconsistent identifi-
cations into evidence even if not made under oath or subject to cross-examina-
tion. A large percentage of the cases involving prior inconsistent statements
involve inconsistent identifications.); MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); State v.
Woods, 662 P.2d 579, 584 (Mont. 1983); State v. Creekmore, 196 Mont. 187,
192, 640 P.2d 439, 442 (1982); State v. Dolan, 620 P.2d 355, 358-59 (Mont.
1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(a) (1985); Kaplan v. State, 99 Nev. 449,
452, 663 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 (1983); Dorsey v. State, 96 Nev. 951, 953, 620 P.2d
1261, 1262 (1980); Levi v. State, 95 Nev. 746, 748-49, 602 P.2d 189, 190 (1979);
N.M. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 144, 584 P.2d 182,
190-91 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 297, 599 P.2d
1086, 1094-95 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1986) ("[O]therwise admissible
prior inconsistent statements of a declarant who is a witness in a judicial pro-
ceeding and is available for cross-examination may be used as substantive evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein." Id. at 70. The court
did note, however, that the prior inconsistent statement in Brady "was rendered
under highly reliable circumstances assuring that they were voluntary, knowing
and understanding." Id. at 71.); State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300
S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983); UTAH R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A) (specifically permitting the use of prior statement as substantive
evidence when the prior statement is inconsistent with the witness' present testi-
mony or the witness denies making the statement or claims no memory of the
statement); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(1) (West 1974); Haskins v. State, 97
Wis. 2d 408, 420, 294 N.W.2d 25, 34 (1980); Vogel v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 372, 386,
291 N.W.2d 838, 845 (1980); Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 181, 267 N.W.2d
852, 859 (1978).
Section III
The remaining 10 states and the District of Columbia adhere to the ortho-
dox, pre-Federal Rules view that prior inconsistent statements of witnesses can-
not be admitted as substantive evidence: Ex parte Harris, 428 So. 2d 124 (Ala.
1983); Isbell v. State, 57 Ala. Crim. App. 444, 449, 329 So. 2d 133, 138, cert.
denied, 295 Ala. 407, 329 So. 2d 140 (1976); Brooks v. United States, 448 A.2d
253, 259 (D.C. 1982); Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542, 549 (D.C. 1982);
State v. Thibodeaux, 380 So. 2d 59, 62 (La. 1980); State v. Mosley, 360 So. 2d
844, 845-46 (La. 1978); State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 113, 249 So. 2d 540, 543
(1971); Hall v. State, 292 Md. 683, 687, 441 A.2d 708, 711 (1982); Davis v.
State, 431 So. 2d 468, 471 (Miss. 1983); Sims v. State, 313 So. 2d 388, 391 (Miss.
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1975); State v. Davis, 566 S.W.2d 437, 450 (Mo. 1978); Powell v. Norman Lines
Inc., 674 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Mo. App. 1984); People v. Raja, 77 A.D.2d 322, 325,
433 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (1980) (Although New York currently follows the ortho-
dox view, in 1982 a new Proposed Code of Evidence was developed. NEw
YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK (1982). Rule 803(a)(1) allows prior inconsistent statements into
evidence without requiring the prior statement to be under oath. However, if it
is a criminal case, then the statement must be signed by the witness or made
under oath subject to penalty of perjury.); State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 339-40,
193 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1972); State v. Erby, 56 N.C. App. 358, 361, 289 S.E.2d 86,
88 (1982); State v. Sinclair, 45 N.C. App. 586, 589, 263 S.E.2d 811, 814-15, rev'd
on other grounds, 301 N.C. 193, 270 S.E.2d 418 (1980); State v. Vargas, 420
A.2d 809, 812 (R.I. 1980); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 25 (R.I. 1979); State v.
Quattrocchi, 103 R.I. 115, 124, 235 A.2d 99, 104-05 (1967); Martin v. State, 584
S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093,
1099, 266 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1980); Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 340, 150
S.E.2d 115, 119 (1966); Williams v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 764, 770, 71 S.E.2d
73, 76 (1952); Thornton v. Downes, 177 Va. 451, 459, 14 S.E.2d 345, 351 (1941).
